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ABSTRACT 
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s proposal for a European Security Treaty (EST) is 
an ambitious attempt to reshape the current Euro-Atlantic order, and thereby, advance 
Moscow’s security interests. The EST proposed by Moscow would be a legally binding 
agreement. According to Moscow, it would uphold the principles of international law and 
achieve equal security for all states in the Euro-Atlantic region. However, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies generally view this treaty proposal as an 
attempt to undermine existing Euro-Atlantic security institutions, such as NATO and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The EST proposal reflects 
Russian discontent with the current Euro-Atlantic security order. Many Russians hold 
that NATO has disregarded Russia’s security interests since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, notably in the Alliance enlargement process. Although the EST proposal has been 
dismissed by some observers as a Russian ploy to fracture NATO, governments in the 
Euro-Atlantic region have acknowledged the need to ensure that Russia’s legitimate 
security interests are respected. NATO and Russia may find it to their advantage to 
pursue long-term cooperation on the basis of shared interests. They may then together 
deal effectively with the emerging threats of the twenty-first century.  
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I. RUSSIA’S PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN SECURITY 
TREATY: MOTIVES AND IMPLICATIONS 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s proposal for a new European Security 
Treaty (EST) is the most ambitious initiative undertaken by Russian diplomacy in recent 
years. Some have dismissed it as a clear attempt to empty Euro-Atlantic security 
institutions of their content. However, other commentators have interpreted the Kremlin’s 
proposal as a genuine effort to provide a positive security vision for Europe in the 
twenty-first century. This thesis addresses the following questions: What does Moscow 
hope to gain from the proposed European Security Treaty? To what extent do NATO 
countries regard it as a serious proposal that might become a functioning treaty regime? 
Why, in spite of reservations about cooperation with Moscow, is NATO prepared to 
consider it? What are the implications for this proposal for NATO and the United States? 
B. IMPORTANCE  
The Medvedev initiative constitutes a significant departure from the normal 
course of post-Soviet foreign policy in three respects. First, Moscow has delivered a set 
of ideas that go beyond the reactive. These ideas amount to more than simply a reflexive 
negative response to Alliance policies, such as NATO enlargement into Eastern Europe. 
Medvedev’s proposed EST is an exceptionally ambitious attempt to promote Russia’s 
own vision of European and Euro-Atlantic security. Second, the proposal has ostensibly 
challenged the assumption that Russia’s international behavior is only designed to 
obstruct the interests of others rather to advance a positive agenda of its own. Finally, the 
Medvedev initiative has indicated a new confidence in Russia’s role in world affairs and 
a belief that other great powers must respect its interests.1  
 
1 Bobo Lo, Medvedev and the New European Security Architecture (London: Centre for European 
Reform, July 2009), 1–2. 
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The underlying principle behind Medvedev’s security concept—that is, his EST 
proposal—appears to be redefining the relationships among European security 
institutions in ways that are more inclusive of Russia and its interests. Since the end of 
the Cold War, Russia has felt excluded from the European mainstream. For the past two 
decades, political instability and socio-economic crisis have greatly reduced Moscow’s 
influence abroad and have contributed to Russia’s alienation in the European security 
sphere. This has occurred during a period in which NATO has become identified as the 
normative model of what it means to be European in the realm of military and security 
affairs. The Kremlin has attempted to limit Washington’s influence in Europe and has 
argued that NATO bears an outdated Cold War ideology and has failed to give new 
purpose to its existence.2  
This thesis investigates the hypothesis that Medvedev’s EST proposal is intended 
to establish a multi-polar security architecture that is not only more inclusive of Russian 
strategic interests than the current institutional arrangements, but also one that is better 
suited to deal with the evolving security challenges of the twenty-first century. Although 
the European Union (EU), NATO, and the United States have considerable reservations 
about security cooperation with Moscow, it is in all three parties’ vital strategic interests 
to agree upon a comprehensive European security architecture to provide protection 
against threats ranging from terrorism to nuclear attack.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Medvedev’s proposal has received mixed reviews from officials and experts 
throughout the Euro-Atlantic region, that is, the region encompassed by the territories of 
the states participating in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE). The underlying obstacle to a solution acceptable to all parties resides in their 
differing perspectives and interests. The non-Russian former Soviet republics and the 
former Warsaw Pact states in Eastern Europe have complained for some time that Russia 
has been exploiting its energy wealth to compromise their sovereignty. Additionally, 
many of them subscribe to the belief that the August 2008 Georgia-Russia war and 
 
2 Lo, Medvedev and the New European Security Architecture, 3. 
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Russian disruptions of gas supplies in recent years suggest that Moscow’s overall intent 
may be to weaken NATO’s solidarity and reduce U.S. influence.3 Conversely, some 
countries in Western Europe appear to have been more willing to consider Medvedev’s 
EST initiative seriously than Russia’s neighbors in Eastern Europe. Additionally, 
cooperation with Russia is important for the EU’s energy sector. Moreover, many 
Europeans have disagreed with Washington’s actions in Kosovo and Iraq, as well.4 In 
their view, enhanced cooperation with Russia appears enticing.   
This thesis discusses the main barriers to improving multilateral security 
cooperation by analyzing the varied strategic perspectives in the Euro-Atlantic region 
shaping reactions to the EST proposal. From the official Russian perspective, NATO 
continues to follow an outdated ideology intent on Russian containment.5 From this 
perspective, restructured European security architecture is needed to establish a new 
order that is more respectful of Russian strategic interests. In the eyes of the Kremlin, this 
would entail minimizing Washington’s influence in European affairs. Furthermore, 
Moscow perceives NATO enlargement as its most immediate security threat. Therefore, 
this thesis examines the Russian case for a new European security architecture as an 
alternative to the current NATO–dominated structure. Through the lens of the Kremlin, it 
appears, the EST is a vehicle designed to support the ascendance of a reformed regional 
power able to rebuff the enlargement and outreach policies of a Cold War relic, such as 
NATO. 
Despite intense opposition to the EST on the part of some allies and reservations 
about cooperation with Moscow, NATO is nonetheless prepared to consider it. The 
Alliance is aware that reducing nuclear stockpiles, defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan, 
and denying the Iran a nuclear weapons arsenal are all goals that cannot be achieved 
 
3 Richard J. Krickus, Medvedev’s Plan: Giving Russia a Voice but Not a Veto in a New European 
Security System (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2009), 3. 
4 Laurynas Jonavicius, Dmitry Medvedev’s Speech in Evian: Reading Between the Lines (Vilnius, LI: 
Eastern Europe Studies Centre, 2009), 6. 
5 Lo, Medvedev and the New European Security Architecture, 2. 
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without Moscow’s help.6 NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen further 
articulated this point in a speech delivered in December 2009 in Moscow. He advocated a 
stronger NATO-Russian partnership via the NATO-Russian Council (NRC), given that 
both sides share an interest in curbing threats, such as the spread of terrorism, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and drug trafficking.7  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has taken on functions in addition to 
collective defense. Allied governments have employed the Alliance to perform tasks in 
support of collective security. Cooperation with former adversaries and other non-NATO 
nations in the Euro-Atlantic region, crisis management, and peace operations have 
emerged as prominent new roles for the Alliance in an unpredictable twenty-first century. 
Possibly, the greatest foreign policy challenge for NATO and the EU is determining how 
to achieve a more productive relationship with Russia while advancing policies toward 
former Soviet republics, which embody western values and advance EU and NATO 
interests. Moscow strongly opposes a Euro-Atlantic security environment dominated by 
NATO and the United States. In November 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev 
unveiled a proposed EST, which has been widely perceived as an attempt to weaken 
NATO and minimize Washington’s influence in European security affairs.  
The Medvedev proposal is significant because it is a noteworthy departure from 
the characteristic post-Soviet Russian foreign policy role of acting as a “spoiler” and 
hindering states in pursuing their strategic interests. The EST proposal represents a more 
self-assured Russia, advancing a positive agenda, which seeks to revise the existing 
European security architecture to meet today’s emerging challenges.  The EST proposal 
published in November 2009 has to some extent clarified the blurred vision set forth by 
Medvedev in two prior speeches delivered in Berlin (June 2008) and Evian (October 
 
6 Krickus, Medvedev’s Plan: Giving Russia a Voice but Not a Veto in a New European Security 
System, 22. 
7 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO and Russia, Partners for the Future,” Speech by NATO Secretary 
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations, Moscow, 
December 17, 2009, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_60223.htm. 
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2008). Careful analysis of the provisions in the proposed treaty sheds light on Moscow’s 
intentions, including the extent to which the EST could be useful in reasserting its 
influence in European security affairs. The EST may also provide insight as to whether 
NATO, under its provisions, would face the dilemma of integrating Russia into the 
Alliance decision-making process.  
This thesis identifies areas of consensus amongst scholars who have asked similar 
questions in analyzing the EST. This thesis also examines previous research efforts and 
builds upon them to put Medvedev’s EST proposal into perspective. The countries of the 
Euro-Atlantic region maintain differing strategic perspectives due to their divergent 
historical, political, and economic backgrounds. This diversity presents a hurdle in 
establishing concrete multi-lateral security cooperation. The EST proposal offers an 
occasion to analyze how the current European security architecture could be made more 
inclusive of Russian strategic interests while continuing to support those of NATO 
member states and other countries in the Euro-Atlantic region.  
Commentators have agreed that Medvedev’s EST proposal lacks the details 
required to make this proposal a credible security alternative. Additionally, experts 
continue to hold that a value gap exists between the Alliance and Russia. This position is 
justified through the EST’s focus on security problems over democratic and human rights 
issues.8  
First and foremost, the EST proposal lacks the requisite chapter and verse to be 
taken seriously by states in the Euro-Atlantic region as the foundation for a revised 
security architecture. Medvedev’s five “specific provisions,” which lay the foundation for 
the EST, provide neither specific nor original ideas for advancing European security. 
Respect for international law, national sovereignty and territorial integrity are all noble 




8 Sergei Karaganov and Timofei Bordachev, Towards a New Euro–Atlantic Security Architecture 
(London: Report of Russian Experts for the Valdai Discussion Club, December 2009), 13. 
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Next, some observers in NATO countries have criticized the EST proposal 
provisions because they are unrealistic. For example, Article 9 states that Parties to the 
treaty “reaffirm that their obligations under other international agreements in the area of 
security, which are in effect on the date of signing of this Treaty are not incompatible 
with the Treaty.”9  
As noted previously, some observers in NATO and EU countries have drawn 
attention to a perceived value gap between NATO and Russia in view of Moscow’s 
failure to acknowledge the importance of democracy and human rights in the EST text. 
The Russian government’s decision not to allude to democracy may stem from the non-
liberal political regime now taking shape in Russia. 
Russian commentators have referred to this regime’s conclusion that the slogan of 
“proliferating democracy” during “color revolutions” concealed a desire to broaden 
spheres of geopolitical dominance.10 Many observers in NATO and EU countries believe 
that Russia under Vladimir Putin has taken a path reminiscent of the Soviet Union in its 
lack of respect for democratic norms. Autocratic rule has clashed with Moscow’s claim 
that Russia wishes to have a democratic government and a thriving free market.11 Putin’s 
exploitation of Russia’s energy assets as a geo-political weapon has clashed with his 
assertion that positive relations with Russia’s neighbors have been a major foreign policy 
objective. In short, for many observers in NATO and EU countries, the prevailing truth is 
that Russia is a revisionist power, which seeks to dominate its neighbors. In their view, to 
expect the Kremlin leadership to behave otherwise is implausible.  
Previous research in identifying both Moscow’s objectives for a revised European 
security architecture and critical reactions to the EST proposal has identified various 
gaps. For example, how could the EST be perceived as an attempt to undermine NATO? 
Why is the EST so vague? What reactions does Moscow hope to obtain from this 
 
9 “European Security Treaty,” November 29, 2009, (Unofficial Translation), President of Russia 
Official Web Portal, http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2009/11/223072.shtml. 
10 Karaganov and Bordachev, Towards a New Euro–Atlantic Security Architecture, 13. 
11 Krickus, Medvedev’s Plan: Giving Russia a Voice but Not a Veto in a New European Security 
System, 19. 
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proposal? Does Russia have a long-term strategy for winning support for the EST? This 
thesis attempts to answer these questions through an analysis of the differences in 
strategic perspective in the Euro-Atlantic region. Identifying these differences may 
clarify Russian objections to NATO’s post-Cold War policies, as well as why some 
NATO member states are more open than others to dialogue regarding a multi-polar 
security architecture, which would be more inclusive of Russian strategic interests than 
the current arrangements. For example, a barrier to a unified approach to Russia resides 
in the cleavages between certain long-established NATO allies in Western Europe and 
the new allies in Central and Eastern Europe regarding relations with Moscow. Officials 
and experts in France and Germany, for example, view Russia as more an important 
economic partner today, relying on its energy sector, than a security threat, and welcome 
attempts to establish stronger bilateral ties. In contrast, observers in Poland and the Baltic 
states tend to believe that Moscow has continued to exploit its energy assets to 
compromise their sovereignty. Additionally, in their view, the August 2008 Georgia-
Russia war has proven that Russia cannot be trusted as a reliable security partner, in view 
of its attempts to maintain a sphere of influence in its near abroad.12 Despite such 
cleavages, it is vital that NATO members reconcile their differences and deal with Russia 
in a united way. Bridging the gaps in the Euro-Atlantic region’s strategic perspectives 
may provide a foundation for assessing Moscow’s intentions for the EST proposal and 
analyzing its implications. How well founded, for example, are perceptions of this treaty 
as an attempt to undermine the Alliance’s cohesion by driving a wedge between 
Washington and the Europeans? 
In evaluating the current literature addressing Medvedev’s EST proposal, this 
thesis catalogues and evaluates the arguments for and against this proposed treaty. 
Richard J. Krickus’s monograph, Medvedev’s Plan: Giving Russia a Voice but Not a Veto 
in a New European Security System, provides an overview of the essential arguments in 
evaluating the criticisms of the EST and the barriers to multi-lateral cooperation in a 
future European security system more inclusive of Russian strategic interests. Samuel A. 
 
12 Krickus, Medvedev’s Plan: Giving Russia a Voice but Not a Veto in a New European Security 
System, 83. 
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Greene and Dmitri Trenin further argue the necessity for the West to reengage with 
Moscow in their paper, (Re) Engaging Russia in an Era of Uncertainty. This paper 
advances the thesis that the West must seek to achieve an institutionalized partnership 
with Russia by incorporating its interests. Towards a New Euro-Atlantic Security 
Architecture, by Sergei Karaganov and Timofei Bordachev, presents a Russian 
perspective on the benefits of the EST proposal. Karaganov and Bordachev hold that “the 
most attractive aspect of this solution is the possibility to make the parties’ commitments 
in the field of collective security legally binding.”13 Their paper further warns, “leaving 
things as they are will inevitably lead to a hidden or open rivalry between various sub-
organizations of European security.”14 In short, these three sources argue that the longer 
Russia remains on the periphery of the European security system, the more apt it will be 
to undermine it and postpone further prospects for a more profound re-engagement with 
NATO than has taken place so far since the August 2008 Georgia-Russia war.   
To counter this argument, various sources have responded by declaring the EST a 
ploy to fracture NATO and drive a wedge between Washington and its European allies. 
Bobo Lo of the Centre for European Reform argues that the Alliance must preserve unity 
and discipline in approaching the EST proposal. Although the EST proposal represents a 
softened foreign policy approach concerning European affairs, some things remain 
constant: Russia continues to believe that it is a great global power and that the former 
Soviet republics belong in its sphere of influence and Moscow maintains a realist 
perspective in viewing the world as a competitive arena.15 This argument summarizes the 
general contention of various sources that Russia simply cannot be relied upon or trusted 
to be a cooperative player in international politics. 
 
13 Karaganov and Bordachev, Towards a New Euro–Atlantic Security Architecture, 17. 
14 Ibid., 14. 
15 Lo, Medvedev and the New European Security Architecture, 8. 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis is based on qualitative historical study and analysis. Medvedev’s EST 
proposal neither identifies tangible objectives nor adds new principles to the UN Charter, 
the Helsinki Final Act, and other basic documents.  
This thesis relies on both primary and secondary sources. An essential component 
of the research is an analysis of the unofficial English translation of Medvedev’s EST 
proposal posted on the Russian president’s website. Further analysis is conducted through 
various secondary sources, including scholarly studies and news articles.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter I discusses the Russian EST 
proposal’s significance and the sources and methodology of the thesis. Chapter II 
examines the Russian case for a new security system based on the proposed EST, as well 
as the arguments opposed to it. This analysis demonstrates the prominent shortcomings of 
the EST proposal, including how it fails to enhance the European security architecture set 
in place by the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. The thesis considers Russian motives in 
proposing the EST, as well as its implications for NATO and the United States.  Chapter 
III assesses why NATO is prepared to discuss the EST, despite intense opposition to the 
EST on the part of some allies and their reservations about cooperation with Moscow. 
Chapter IV offers conclusions and recommendations on how NATO might respond to the 
EST proposal.   
 10
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II.  THE EST PROPOSAL: MOSCOW’S CASE FOR A NEW 
EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins by providing a descriptive overview of President Medvedev’s 
EST proposal, highlighting its purpose and vision for European security. Next, it raises 
key questions about the EST. It examines the Russian case for a new security system 
based on the proposed EST, as well as the arguments opposed to it. Finally, this analysis 
demonstrates the prominent shortcomings of the EST proposal, including how it fails to 
build upon the security principles established by the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. This 
chapter considers Russian motives in proposing the EST, as well as its implications for 
NATO and the United States, in particular.   
B.  THE EST: AN OVERVIEW 
President Medvedev’s EST proposal is Moscow’s vision for creating an undivided 
Euro-Atlantic security space. It is designed to revise the current security architecture, 
which Russia perceives as an impediment to its regional strategic interests. According to 
Medvedev, the goal is to negotiate a new wide-ranging pact in the form of a treaty 
“between the whole Euro-Atlantic area from Vancouver to Vladivostok.”16 Russia holds 
that this legally binding treaty would rid Europe of what Moscow perceives as dividing 
lines, sanctify the basic principles of international law, and achieve equal security for all 
states in the Euro-Atlantic region.   
The final step in this analysis is to outline systematically the contents of the EST, 
beginning with the preamble and examining all the significant articles. This official text 
is described on the website of the Russian president as an “unofficial translation.” The 
Russians may use this formula to protect themselves from unwanted interpretations. The 
 
16 Dmitry Medvedev, “Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders,” 
Berlin, June 5, 2008, 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2008/06/05/2203_type82912type82914type84779_202153.shtml. 
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quality of the English employed in this “unofficial translation” is sometimes sub-optimal, 
and calling this and other documents published on the website of the president of Russia 
“unofficial translations” may also provide an excuse for the awkward formulations—
including unexplained ellipses—that are reproduced verbatim in this thesis.   
1. Preamble 
According to the preamble, the parties would adopt the EST as a legally binding 
mechanism in order to “promote their relations in the spirit of friendship and cooperation 
in conformity with international law.”17 The preamble states that the parties would be 
guided by “the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970), Helsinki Final Act of 
the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975), as well as provisions of 
the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes (1982) and 
Charter for European Security (1999).”18 Above all, the EST acknowledges and supports 
the role of the UN Security Council, “which bears the primary responsibility for 
maintaining international peace and security.”19 
2.  Articles 1–3 
First and foremost, the EST is based on “the principles of indivisible, equal and 
undiminished security.”20 Essentially, this means that any security measures taken by a 
party to the treaty are to be “implemented with due regard to security interests of all other 
parties.” According to Article 2, parties to the treaty would have to ensure that decisions 
within the framework of the organizations and alliances to which they belong “do not 
affect significantly security of any Party or Parties to the Treaty.”21 In other words, no 
 
17 “European Security Treaty,” November 29, 2009 (Unofficial Translation), President of Russia 
Official Web Portal, http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2009/11/223072.shtml, preamble. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., Article 1. 
21 Ibid., Article 2, paragraph 2. 
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party should seek to enhance its own security at the expense of another party. Article 3 of 
the proposed EST states that parties are entitled to request “information on any 
significant legislative, administrative or organizational measures” taken by another party 
if the measures “in the opinion of the Requesting Party, might affect its security.”22 This 
part of the EST advocates transparency and mutual trust among the parties via 
communication “through diplomatic channels.”23  
3.  Articles 4–8  
The major theme in these articles is the establishment of forums to address 
grievances if a party believes that another party has violated or threatens to violate the 
EST. These articles provide detailed procedures for resolving conflicts. These procedures 
include bilateral and multilateral consultations, a conference of the parties, and an 
emergency or “extraordinary” conference in the case of a crisis or threat of attack. These 
forums act as mechanisms “to address issues related to the substance of this Treaty, and 
to settle differences or disputes that might arise between the Parties in connection with its 
interpretation or application.”24  
Article 7 of the proposed EST states, “every Party shall be entitled to consider an 
armed attack against any other Party an armed attack against itself.”25 Moreover, “it shall 
be entitled to render the attacked Party, subject to its consent, the necessary assistance, 
including the military one, until the UN Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security.”26  
 
22 “European Security Treaty,” Article 3, paragraph 1. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., Article 4. 
25 Ibid., Article 7, paragraph 2. 
26 Ibid. 
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4.  Articles 9–12 
The major theme expressed in these articles is that “the Parties to the Treaty shall 
not assume international obligations incompatible with the Treaty.”27 Yet, according to 
Article 9, the EST is not to affect the “primary responsibility of the UN Security Council 
for maintaining international peace and security, as well as rights and obligations of the 
Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.”28 The EST is inclusive; that it is “open 
for signature by all States of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space from Vancouver to 
Vladivostok as well as by the following international organizations: the European Union, 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Collective Security Treaty 
Organization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Community of Independent States 
in…from…to….”29  
5.  Articles 13–14 
The final two articles deal with procedures for acceding to and withdrawing from 
the EST. Article 13 states, “any State or international organization may accede to this 
Treaty after its entry into force, subject to the consent of all Parties to this Treaty, by 
depositing the relevant notification with the Depositary.”30 Article 14 further stipulates 
each party’s right to withdraw from the EST “should it determine that extraordinary 
circumstances pertaining to the substance of the Treaty have endangered its supreme 
interests.”31 
C.  THE EST: KEY QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED 
The proposed EST raises the following questions: What is the Russian case for a 
new structure of European security institutions based on the Medvedev proposal? What 
are the main arguments opposed to the Russian proposal? What shortcomings have been 
 
27 “European Security Treaty,” Article 9, paragraph 3. 
28 Ibid., Article 9, paragraph 1. 
29 Ibid., Article 10. 
30 Ibid., Article 13, paragraph 2. 
31 Ibid., Article 14. 
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highlighted by critics of the Russian EST proposal? According to Medvedev, existing 
European security institutions, such as NATO, bear “the stamp of an ideology inherited 
from the past” and have failed to provide universal mechanisms for cooperation and 
conflict prevention.32  
D.  THE RUSSIAN CASE FOR THE EST 
Russian officials and commentators have criticized certain organizations for their 
perceived adherence to an outdated Cold War ideology and their supposed inability to 
respond to new challenges and threats. In February 2010, at the 46th Munich Security 
Conference, Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, stated, “by overcoming the 
bloc-based Cold War approaches in the European architecture, and the derivative fears 
they arouse with regard to ‘spheres of influence,’ we will provide the new quality of 
mutual trust that Europe so desperately needs in contemporary conditions.”33 Russians 
argue that a bloc approach has perpetuated a bipolar worldview that has neglected the 
Russian Federation’s strategic interests and relegated it to the periphery in its 
participation in security institutions, such as the OSCE and NATO.  
Russians maintain that NATO in particular has revived open suspicion and 
strategic rivalry. For example, many Russians hold that NATO expansion has dealt a 
blow to Russia’s trust towards Canada, the United States and its European Allies. 
According the current Russian military doctrine published on February 6, 2010, NATO 
expansion is considered the top threat to Russian security. The first among “the main 
external military dangers” listed in the document is “the desire to endow the force 
potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with global functions carried 
out in violation of the norms of international law and to move the military infrastructure 
of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by 
 
32 Medvedev, “Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders.”  
33 Sergey Lavrov, “Speech at the 46th Munich Security Conference,” Munich, February 6, 2010, 
http://www.securityconference.de/Lavrov–Sergey.463.0.html?&L=1. 
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expanding the bloc.”34 Contrary to the fate of the Warsaw Pact, NATO has continued to 
grow and has become a multi-dimensional collective defense alliance, adding various 
roles, such as counter-terrorism, crisis response, and anti-piracy operations. However, 
from the Russian perspective, to quote Sergei Karaganov and Timofei Bordachev, “the 
Euro-Atlantic space has failed to overcome the legacy of the bipolar confrontation and 
create a stable and efficient system for multilateral interaction to counter traditional and 
new threats.”35  
According to Karaganov and Bordachev, the current European security system 
lacks universal mechanisms for cooperation and conflict prevention.  
The existing mechanisms and institutions for multilateral interaction on 
security matters deny Europe the ability to respond to new challenges and 
threats and to be an adequate participant in international [affairs]. There is 
no efficient institutional and legal framework in Europe for cooperation of 
all states in such matters as countering drug trafficking, terrorism and 
cybercrime, biosecurity, collective prevention and reaction to emergencies 
and humanitarian crises, environmental protection, and efforts to meet 
environmental challenges, including global climate change. The European 
Union and NATO prefer to address these issues independently, which 
rules out full-fledged participation of Russia and many other countries in 
these efforts and which also paralyzes efforts of the OSCE.36  
Some Russians have complained that the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP) is primarily intended to unite member states and augment their national 
capabilities rather than to strengthen international security in general. According to 
Karaganov and Bordachev, “the mechanisms they build, such as the European Security 
and Defense Policy, are primarily intended to unite member states and enhance their 
individual capabilities, rather than [to] strengthen international security in general.”37 
Russian commentators hold that institutional constraints on the coordinated participation 
of Russia and other non-member countries in NATO-led and EU-led operations to 
 
34 “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” approved by Russian Federation presidential 
edict on 5 February 2010, Official website of the Russian Federation President; http://kremlin.ru/, English 
translation at OpenSource.gov, CEP20100208042001.  
35 Karaganov and Bordachev, Towards a new Euro–Atlantic Security Architecture, 6. 
36 Ibid., 7. 
37 Ibid., 8. 
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counter emerging security threats make such efforts ineffective and unproductive.38 This 
may encourage non-EU or NATO member countries to focus more on bilateral 
cooperation, for example, between Russia and the United States, or between Russia and 
individual EU countries. According to Russian observers, Medvedev’s EST proposal 
seeks to transcend the existing European security system by uniting existing security 
institutions and states from Vancouver to Vladivostok to respond to emerging threats in a 
transparent manner.  
Moscow considers the era of NATO-centered unipolarity in European security 
affairs to be over and aspires to establish a more multi-polar security system inclusive of 
its strategic interests and attentive to its traditional role as a regional great power. It is 
likely that Russia will endure as an independent international player in security affairs. 
Russian commentators argue that Russia and other states that remain outside European 
security institutions, such as NATO and the EU, should support a revised security 
architecture based on the EST.  
According to the Kremlin, the EST proposal’s objective is to establish an 
undivided multi-polar European security architecture in an effort to strengthen peace, 
increase stability and enhance the predictability of certain states and multinational 
associations. As noted previously, according to Article 1, “the Parties shall cooperate 
with each other on the basis of the principles of indivisible, equal and undiminished 
security.”39 In addition, Article 2 stipulates that the key principles of relations between 
states would be based on meeting existing international commitments guided by the 
principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act, the 
Charter for European Security, the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of 




38 Karaganov and Bordachev, Towards a new Euro–Atlantic Security Architecture, 8. 
39 “European Security Treaty,” Article 1. 
40 Ibid., Preamble. 
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In other words, under this proposal, all international actions—whether by 
individual states or collective bodies—would be obliged to respect the security interests 
of all other states under existing international commitments. As the EST acknowledges, 
this obligation is already expressed in the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and other 
documents. The EST proposal does not explicitly seek to dissolve NATO or other 
multilateral organizations, nor does it call for an American withdrawal from Europe. 
However, as Dmitri Trenin, the Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, has written, “it 
does call for NATO members to place their allegiance to the proposed treaty above their 
alliance obligations, and work within alliances to promote the treaty’s objectives.”41 For 
example, Article 2 asserts that “a Party to the Treaty which is a member of military 
alliances, coalitions or organizations shall seek to ensure that such alliances, coalitions or 
organizations observe principles in the Charter of the United Nations…as well as in 
Article 1 of this Treaty, and that decisions in the framework of such alliances, coalitions, 
or organizations do not significantly affect security of any Party or Parties to the 
Treaty.”42 It is not clear what the EST would add to the existing international legal and 
political commitments that it calls for upholding.  
A central component of Medvedev’s EST proposal is cooperation “on the basis of 
the principles of indivisible, equal, and undiminished security.”43 To quote the EST, “a 
Party to the Treaty shall not undertake, participate in or support any actions or activities 
affecting significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the Treaty.”44 This implies 
that the EST is to be enacted as a legally binding commitment by all participating 
countries not to strengthen their own security at the expense of others. Dmitri Trenin has 
acknowledged that existing documents, such as the 1945 UN Charter, the 1975 Helsinki 
Final Act, and the 1999 Charter on European Security, already provide a legal 
framework, which is quite specific on such issues as the use of force, or the threat of such 
 
41 Dmitri Trenin, “Talking to Moscow,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 
D.C., January–February 2010, 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=24657&zoom_highlight=europea
n+security+treaty. 
42 “European Security Treaty,” Article 2, paragraph 2. 
43 Ibid., Article 1. 
44 Ibid., Article 2, paragraph 1. 
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use.45 Nevertheless, the EST proposal seeks to streamline the legal framework of 
Europe’s current institutional security architecture by means of a single binding legal 
instrument.  
The EST proposal has not only highlighted priorities in Russian thinking; it has 
also revealed Moscow’s sensitivity to changing domestic and international circumstances. 
The relative unity of NATO and the EU over Moscow’s use of force in Georgia, the 
impact of the financial crisis, and the election of Barack Obama as the President of the 
United States have radically changed the external context of Russia’s policymaking. As a 
result, some analysts argue, Medvedev’s EST proposal has revealed a conciliatory and 
inclusive approach in advocating a revised European security architecture. In their view, 
this shift in tone was illustrated by Medvedev’s address at the London School of 
Economics in April 2009, immediately after the G-20 Summit.46 Deviating from the 
aggressive rhetoric of his speeches in Berlin and Evian in 2008, which criticized NATO, 
Medvedev stressed that NATO “has a deserved place in the security system in the world 
and in Europe. It is the strongest military-political organization in the world today, and it 
has had quite comfortable conditions for development over these last years.”47 In effect, 
he argued that the EST would not replace existing organizations with new ones. 
Medvedev later asserted in an address at Helsinki University in April 2009 that the 
proposed new security architecture would involve “all Euro-Atlantic states, international 
organizations—including of course the European Union, NATO, the OSCE, CSTO, 
CIS—regional organizations and, of course, all the countries that belong to these 
organizations.”48 As a result, Article 10 of the EST states that it “shall be open for 
signature by all States of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space from Vancouver to 
Vladivostok as well as by the following international organizations: the European Union, 
 
45 Trenin, “Talking to Moscow.” Trenin’s observation should be qualified by the observation that the 
Helsinki Final Act is not a legally binding treaty but a political declaration. 
46 Lo, Medvedev and the New European Security Architecture, 4. 
47 Dmitry Medvedev, “Meeting with Students and Staff of the London School of Economics and 
Political Science,” London, England, April 2, 2009, 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2009/04/02/2200_type82914type84779_214720.shtml. 
48 Dmitry Medvedev, “Speech at Helsinki University and Answers to Questions from Audience,” 
Helsinki, Finland, April 20, 2009, 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2009/04/20/1919_type82912type82914type84779_215323.shtml. 
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Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Collective Security Treaty 
Organization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Community of Independent States 
in…from…to…”49 
E.  RUSSIAN MOTIVATIONS FOR THE EST 
The Kremlin’s motivations for putting forth the EST proposal are apparently not 
only to create a more multi-polar security system, but also to dispel the West’s negative 
perceptions of Russian foreign policy practices. The Medvedev proposal is significant in 
its departure from the normal course of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy in three 
respects. To begin, Moscow has taken a leadership role in proposing a collection of ideas 
that go beyond the reactive. Although Medvedev displayed a negative perception of 
European security trends during his Berlin speech in June 2008, his discourse offered 
more than negative reactions to NATO enlargement, U.S. missile defense plans, and 
general American unilateralism. This approach to foreign diplomacy signals a vast 
departure from the Yeltsin and Putin years, which have been characterized as more ad 
hoc and reactive in nature. Medvedev’s EST proposal sets out Russia’s own vision of 
European and Euro- Atlantic security.  
Second, Moscow’s plan for a new European security architecture challenges the 
assumption that Russia’s international influence is predominantly preventative. 
Essentially, this means that the longstanding perception of Russia’s international policy 
among experts and officials in NATO and EU governments is that it has been far better 
suited to obstructing the interests of others than advancing a positive agenda of its own.50 
For instance, veto power as a permanent member of the UN Security Council has been a 
long-standing mechanism for asserting Moscow’s international influence for decades. 
Therefore, the EST proposal may reflect a Russian desire to play a leading role as a 
responsible player in regional and global affairs. 
 
49 “European Security Treaty,” Article 10. 
50 Lo, Medvedev and the New European Security, 1. 
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Finally, the EST proposal has signaled a new self assurance in Russian foreign 
policy. In contrast to Russian policy during the Yeltsin and Putin presidencies, it has 
revealed a confidence that Russia is finally able to assume a more active role in 
international affairs, and that others—great powers and small states alike—must respect 
its interests.51 The question still remains to what degree other countries in the Euro-
Atlantic region are willing to satisfy Moscow’s desire for such a role in international 
security affairs.  
Branding Europe’s current security system a Cold War relic, Russia seeks to 
revise European security institutions in ways more favorable to its strategic interests and 
to demonstrate its ability to wield influence in the region. The EST represents an attempt 
by Moscow to accomplish this in conjunction with the employment of “soft power” 
instruments, such as economic and energy leverage, most notably in former Soviet 
republics. Many western experts believe that Russia seeks to create a more multi-polar 
configuration of power in the region in an attempt to legitimize its control over its 
traditional hegemonic neighborhood in nearby former Soviet republics.52 Moscow 
regards the existing European security system, dominated by the United States and 
NATO, as a hindrance to this. According to experts, Moscow’s ultimate vision for a 
European security system is an environment that would facilitate the projection of 
Russian influence. The EST is, therefore, a means to an end. According to Bobo Lo, 
director of the Russia and China programs at the Centre for European Reform, Moscow 
aspires to identify its position as “the ‘regional superpower’ in the former Soviet 
space.”53 The consequence would be to place Russia in the European mainstream with 
recognition as a great power on a par with the United States and the European Union.54 
Moscow has extended invitations to organizations and alliances to join the EST in 
an effort to achieve two objectives: to strengthen the legitimacy of the weak 
organizations founded and led by Russia, such as the CIS and the CSTO, and to dilute the 
 
51 Lo, Medvedev and the New European Security, 1–2. 




                                                
collective defense obligations of NATO members. Incorporating these Russian-led 
alliances under the umbrella of the all-encompassing EST would further Moscow’s desire 
to wield influence, especially in its traditional sphere of influence in the former Soviet 
republics. For example, Russian security influence in this capacity would probably 
dampen prospects for either Georgia or Ukraine to achieve NATO membership.  
Exploiting divisions within the NATO alliance may polarize its members.  This 
would severely degrade the effectiveness of the most influential organization in the 
current European security system and allow Russia to gain further sway in European 
security affairs. However, former Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe distrust 
Moscow’s new assertiveness. Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in 2008 has 
heightened the perception of vulnerability of some of the new NATO member states, 
perpetuating fears of Russian domination, which have burdened them for centuries.55 
Conversely, from a security standpoint, several Western European states (such as France, 
Germany, and Italy) feel less threatened by Moscow than they did during the Cold War, 
and they have chosen to focus more on developing economic transparency and 
cooperation with Russia than in the past. As a result, some of these states have expressed 
a cautious willingness to discuss Medvedev’s proposal.  
The EU and Russia share a mutually dependent economic relationship, most 
notably in the energy sector. Russia is the EU’s third largest trading partner, behind the 
United States and China. Additionally, it is the largest supplier of energy to the European 
Union (supplying 33% of the EU’s oil, 42% of its gas and 25% of its coal in 2007).56  
Varied perspectives among EU member states in the security and economic 
spheres have prevented the development of a comprehensive relationship between the 




55 Manuel de la Camara, European Security and EU–Russian Relations (Madrid: Real Instituto El 
Cano, May 14, 2009), 5. 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcan
o/elcano_in/zonas_in/defense+security/ari76–2009. 
56 Ibid., 4. 
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European security system, its mere introduction has the potential to create disarray in 
European security affairs, which may diminish U.S. influence in the region and further 
encourage Moscow to assert its own influence. 
F.  WESTERN CRITICISMS OF THE EST: AN OVERVIEW 
Medvedev’s EST proposal has received broad criticism from experts and officials 
in NATO and EU countries owing in part to its inability to enhance the security 
principles already articulated in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. The Final Act is a 
political declaration, which established a set of principles for guiding relations between 
all states in the Euro-Atlantic region (except Albania) during the Cold War in fields 
categorized in three “baskets.”57 Basket I principles concern relations between 
participating states, including refraining from the threat or use of force and respecting the 
inviolability of frontiers and the territorial integrity of states. Basket II covers cooperation 
in economics, science, technology, and the environment. Basket III cooperation 
encompasses human rights, freedom of information, culture, and education.58 The role of 
the Final Act and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
process during the Cold War has been characterized by four European authors as follows: 
“the CSCE process with its emphasis on the human rights dimension was essentially 
important for the emergence of the East European opposition movements, and the 
ideological warfare that the West pursued throughout the years of communism did play 
an important role in de-legitimizing the communist system. No wonder, then, that the 
‘return to Europe’ was an elementary idea in most Central and East European countries at 
the time of the revolutions.”59  
Today, the EST has been perceived by NATO and EU experts and officials as a 
legally binding treaty pursued by Moscow that could have significant implications for the 
 
57 Albania refused to participate in the CSCE during the Cold War and did not join the CSCE until 
June 19, 1991. 
58 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 37–38. 
59 Sten Berglund, Frank H. Aarebrot, Henri Vogt, and Georgi Karasimeonov, Challenges to 
Democracy: Eastern Europe Ten Years after the Collapse of Communism (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 2001), 26.  
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current Euro-Atlantic security system. From the EU perspective, the current system has 
adequately preserved European security.60 Therefore, any security dialogue should be 
held under the auspices of the current security organization involving all the states in the 
Euro-Atlantic region—that is, the OSCE, an institutional extension of the Helsinki Final 
Act. Rather than create the new security institution advocated by Moscow in the EST 
proposal, the EU has sought to reaffirm existing security commitments. For example, the 
“Corfu Process” has provided a forum for OSCE participating states to address where 
they have failed to respect the principles of comprehensive and indivisible security and 
how they can strengthen the implementation of commitments across all three OSCE 
dimensions or “baskets” of security.61 It has sought to restore trust and confidence 
between the OSCE participating states, to assist them in implementing their 
commitments, and to clear the ground for concrete progress on security challenges.62 The 
OSCE remains the unchallenged place to discuss fundamental principles of state 
interaction in the Euro-Atlantic region and to build new trust for joint action against 
complex challenges. Therefore, any attempt by Moscow to deviate from this framework 
by pursuing a revised security architecture would not only lack credibility in the eyes of 
the European Union and NATO; it would probably be rejected. According to the NATO 
Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “I don’t see a need for new treaties or new 
legally binding documents because we do have a framework already.”63 
1.  Europe Is More Secure Than Ever 
Regardless of individual differences on concrete policy issues among EU member 
states, there are four fundamental conceptual positions that are shared across the EU, 
which conflict with the EST proposal and form the foundation for further criticisms of 
 
60 Bjorn Fagerberg, “The EU and the Debate on Euro–Atlantic Security,” in The Indivisibility of 
Security: Russia and Euro–Atlantic Security, ed. Andrew Monaghan (Rome: NATO Defense College 
Forum Paper Series, January 2010), 48–51. 
61 Andrew Monaghan, “Defining the Indivisibility of Security: Russia and the Euro–Atlantic 
Community,” The Indivisibility of Security: Russia and Euro–Atlantic Security, Andrew Monaghan, ed. 
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62 Ibid., 38. 
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this proposal. First, most member states of the European Union have the impression that 
they are currently more secure than at any point in their history.64 Medvedev’s proposal 
appears to reflect a widespread opinion of Russian foreign policy commentators that the 
current European security system is in a dire position and in need of sweeping changes. 
The EU is aware of the existing challenges to Euro-Atlantic security. However, the EU’s 
outlook differs from that of Russia. For example, the EU’s confidence is reflected in the 
introduction of the 2003 European Security Strategy, which states, “Europe has never 
been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th 
Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European 
history.”65  The 2008 implementation report acknowledged that in the post-Cold War 
world, the European Union faces increasingly complex threats and challenges. Yet, the 
report states, “the EU remains an anchor of stability. Enlargement has spread democracy 
and prosperity across our continent. The Balkans are changing for the better.”66 The 
bottom line here is that the EU is satisfied with Europe’s current security architecture and  
emerging threats must be addressed. However, the member states of the European Union 
consider themselves incomparably more secure today than at any point in their history. 
Therefore, the EU would caution against drastic measures, which would significantly 
alter an already successful security system. This point underscores the political and 
psychological foundation for the EU’s attitude toward the EST and for the EU’s 
judgment that it runs counter to the EU’s strategic security interests. 
2.  The Existing Security Order Should Be Preserved 
Second, although the existing security order is imperfect, it is valuable and should 
be respected.67 Moscow has asserted that the Euro-Atlantic security system is flawed, 
which has revealed an apparent motivation for the EST proposal. The major flaw from 
 
64 Fagerberg, “The EU and the Debate on Euro–Atlantic Security,” 46.  
65 A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (Brussels: Council of the European 
Union, December 12, 2003), 1. 
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the Kremlin’s perspective is that Russia’s interests are simply being ignored. In June 
2009, at the OSCE Annual Security Review conference, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey 
Lavrov stated, “after the end of the Cold War and the crumbling of the bipolar system 
that divided EU/NATO nations and Comecon/Warsaw Pact states, a sustainable and 
effective system which would embrace states of the West and East never came to fruition. 
The chief systemic drawback consists in that over the 20 years we’ve been unable to 
devise guarantees of the observance of the principle of indivisible security. Today we’re 
witnessing the infringement of a basic principle of relations between states that was laid 
down in the 1999 Charter for European Security and in the documents of the Russia-
NATO Council—the commitment to not secure oneself at others’ expense.”68 A 
centerpiece to the Russian claim that the existing security system is insufficient is 
Moscow’s suspicion towards NATO, especially due to its eastward enlargement.  
Such fervent Russian opposition to NATO enlargement provides the best example 
of the gap that exists between Russian perceptions of security in relation to the EU 
perspective (both NATO member states and non-member states). According to Bjorn 
Fagerberg, a Senior Advisor in the Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 
“looking at Russia from an EU point of view and trying to understand its threat 
perceptions, it would seem that its Western borders have never looked so peaceful and 
unlikely to produce an attack as they do today.”69 One could even make a cogent 
argument that NATO and EU enlargements have produced a strategic stability in Europe 
that has been unrivaled in history. It is evident that a gap in perceptions has fueled 
drastically different views on the merits of the current Euro-Atlantic security sphere. 
Moscow feels left out and threatened by NATO as the center of gravity in European 
security. Conversely, the EU acknowledges that it has shortcomings, yet nevertheless 
places emphasis on the uniqueness of the current system and the successful results it has 
achieved.   
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3.  The Unique Features of This Security Order Must Be Safeguarded 
Third, EU commentators assert, to quote Bjorn Fagerberg again, “the unique 
features that have made this security order so successful must be safeguarded” in order to 
preserve the current system.70 The Kremlin has insisted that the EST proposal is not a 
ploy to rid Europe of the comprehensive approach to security embodied in the “three 
baskets” of the Helsinki Final Act. For example, in April 2009 at Helsinki University, 
President Medvedev stated, “if we could agree on a future treaty [concerning European 
security], we could consider it, if you want, as a kind of ‘Helsinki Plus’ treaty, that is as a 
confirmation, continuation and effective implementation of the principles and instruments 
born out of the Helsinki process, but adapted to the end of ideological confrontation and 
the emergence of new subjects of international law in the twenty-first century.”71 Yet, 
Russian complaints with regard to Euro-Atlantic security generally focus on “hard 
security” matters—that is, politico-military issues, including arms control, peacekeeping 
and conflict management. As a result, Russian commentators convey the impression that 
other areas of security, such as the “human dimension” (respect for human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law), are peripheral in nature. This Russian focus on hard 
security has spawned concern in the EU that the ulterior motive of the EST proposal is to 
“do away with the concept of comprehensive security as such, including the 
commitments in the ‘human dimension.’”72    
Such aspirations would run counter to the development and enhancement of the 
concept of comprehensive strategy, based on the principle that the security of states 
cannot be separated from the security of their citizens. There is consensus in the EU that 
this approach will gain further momentum in the future. “We live in a world where 
terrorism, proliferation in weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, organized  
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crime and failing states are emerging as key threats to our security.”73 These threats are 
becoming more complex, and therefore, require a collective response, not increased 
separation between the different dimensions of security.  
The trans-Atlantic relationship between the European Union and the United States 
presents another unique feature of the Euro-Atlantic security order. This relationship has 
been viewed as one of the pillars of European security. Comments, such as Medvedev’s 
statement that “it is my conviction that Atlanticism as a sole historical principle has 
already had its day” (as stated in Berlin in June 2008) have not been well received by 
most Europeans.74 In addition, they have perpetuated suspicion that the EST proposal 
seeks to drive a wedge between the United States and the European Union. Therefore, 
throughout the security debate, the European Union has insisted that any dialogue 
concerning European security include the United States and Canada.  
4.  The Security Framework Must Develop Gradually 
Fourth, the European Union continues to hold that the Euro-Atlantic security 
framework can only develop gradually and consensually. A fundamental assumption for 
the European Union in the debate on Euro-Atlantic security “is that a solid and lasting 
security order can only be build over time. It must be the result of an incremental, gradual 
process.”75 According to Bjorn Fagerberg of the Secretariat of the Council of the 
European Union, “there is a strong antipathy among the EU’s Member States to anything 
that smacks of big states doing deals over the heads of smaller ones.”76 The member 
states of the European Union therefore feel strongly that any new security framework 
should follow the course of the CSCE process, which eventually led to the Helsinki Final 
Act and the creation of the OSCE.  
The EU approach to security can be explained, in part, to the experiences of 
building the European Union itself. From the EU perspective, this institution has evolved 
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incrementally and consensually, and as a result, the EU approach to building security in 
Europe has followed suit. Many in the European Union believe “that the fluid and 
unpredictable nature of security threats also necessitates adaptable arrangements.”77 
Since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, security threats have evolved in 
unimaginable ways. For example, thirty-five years ago, few could imagine that cyber 
security would become a significant trans-national threat. The bottom line is that security 
cannot be approached in a “fixed” manner with a finite solution. It should be viewed as a 
continual process, which requires security institutions to adapt to changing realities.  
5.  The United States Must Balance Other Factors in Relations with 
Moscow 
The United States has faced a difficult dilemma in balancing its policies regarding 
Euro-Atlantic security and its bilateral relations with Moscow. The dilemma has widely 
affected the U.S. government’s decisions in dealing with Medvedev’s EST proposal. 
Washington has pursued efforts to strengthen NATO, the European Union, and the 
human dimension of the OSCE while also striving to “resetset” relations with Russia. 
Achieving success in these seemingly contradictory objectives has made outright 
rejection of the EST an impractical course. From the U.S. perspective, the OSCE remains 
a crucial Euro-Atlantic security institution along with NATO and the EU. Although 
NATO and EU enlargement have received more attention in recent years, the United 
States views the OSCE as paramount to expanding security dialogue in the Euro-Atlantic 
region. According to Phillip H. Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Europe 
and Eurasian Affairs, “the OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security offers a vehicle 
for engagement across the political-military, economic, and human rights dimensions. 
That it is a process, and that such a process takes time, does not lessen its importance or 
the necessity for sustained U.S. engagement.”78 In addition, the Obama Administration 
has supported the “Corfu Process” as an opportunity to review the current Euro-Atlantic 
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security order, identify new challenges and discuss ideas for revitalizing the organization. 
Furthermore, Assistant Secretary Gordon has taken note of Washington’s interest in 
improving Euro-Atlantic security. “The United States participates actively in this broad 
dialogue and we are open to ideas for improving European security.”79 Washington fully 
supports the current Euro-Atlantic security system and the principles articulated in the 
Helsinki Final Act. The United States shares the EU perspective in adhering to the four 
fundamental criticisms, which form the basis of EU and U.S. analyses of the EST 
proposal. However, Washington must recognize broader strategic interests beyond the 
purview of Euro-Atlantic security in considering its relations with Moscow.   
In an effort to “reset” relations with Moscow, the United States has engaged 
Russia on various fronts (strategic nuclear arms control, Iran, and Afghanistan) where it 
believes such engagement can make a strategic difference. As a result, it has 
deemphasized areas that have caused previous tensions with Moscow, such as NATO 
enlargement. By altering the political and psychological climate, it has paved the way for 
renewed engagement on strategic issues, particularly interests shared by Washington and 
Moscow. The prospects for a renewed security relationship between Washington and 
Moscow have made issues, such as the EST proposal, less relevant and less urgent. In 
other words, the U.S.-Russia strategic partnership is too important to allow a peripheral 
issue, such as the EST, to negatively affect bilateral security cooperation efforts. 
Therefore, Washington must pursue rather contradictory policies in advocating the 
enhancement of Euro-Atlantic security within the OSCE’s Corfu Process, without 
disrupting renewed engagement efforts with Moscow by outright rejection of the EST. 
This requires careful diplomacy in acknowledging Medvedev’s proposal while offering 
constructive criticism meant to further positive relations between Washington and 
Moscow. In February 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated, “some of 
Russia’s proposals contain constructive ideas and we welcome the opportunity to engage 
seriously with Russia on this important subject.”80 Yet, in the end, the United States does 
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not endorse the creation of new treaties concerning the overall framework for Euro-
Atlantic security, and is intent on carrying forward discussions of Euro-Atlantic security 
within existing institutions, such as the OSCE, the NATO-Russian Council, and the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council.      
6.  The EST Lacks Precision 
NATO and EU criticisms of the EST are extensive and represent a general 
attitude of skepticism concerning Moscow’s genuine motives behind this treaty proposal. 
The most widely held criticism concerns the EST’s ambiguity in proposing lofty goals 
with little specific substance. As previously noted, Article 2 stipulates that “a Party to the 
Treaty shall not undertake, participate in or support any actions or activities affecting 
significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the Treaty.”81 Yet, Medvedev has 
failed to define what actions constitute a threat of “affecting significantly security.” 
If the EST came into force, this would inevitably lead to differences of opinion 
among states with varied perceptions in identifying and quantifying threats. Contrasting 
opinions would not only arise between Russia and NATO member states, for example. 
Steven Pifer, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a former U.S. ambassador to 
Ukraine, has observed that the implications could involve multiple states with contending 
judgments. “If the Russian draft were accepted without changes, it would trigger ‘dozens 
of disputes as to meaning,’ Pifer said. Differences of opinion would arise not just 
between Russia and the West, but also between Russia and Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, 
Azerbaijan, and others, Pifer said.”82  
Creating a treaty regime in which individual states could subjectively define what 
“actions or activities” might be “affecting significantly security” would allow EST parties 
to object to virtually any action undertaken by other parties on the grounds that it might 
constitute a threat. Moreover, this concerns both current and aspiring NATO members 
because allowing each EST party to define what it considers a threat would essentially 
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give Russia a veto over further NATO enlargement.83 Finally, Article 2 further 
articulates the EST’s intent to transcend all obligations that EST parties would owe to 
other international organizations or alliances. Both the European Union and NATO are 
wary of such an obligation because it would give Moscow veto power over their 
collective decisions without holding membershi
7.  The EST Fails to Ensure Collective Security Commitments  
The EST’s weak enforcement mechanism would fail to oblige its members to 
uphold any collective commitments to security. For example, Articles 4–6 set the 
parameters for bringing together treaty members in the event of a treaty violation or 
threat of violation. In the event of a crisis, Article 8 states, “the Extraordinary Conference 
of the Parties shall be effective if it is attended by at least four fifths of the Parties of the 
Treaty.”84 According to Mikhail Tsypkin, professor of the National Security Affairs at 
the Naval Postgraduate School, “this provision is in fact more favorable to NATO, which 
could in a crisis simply boycott the conference. Russia, which has no reliable allies, 
would have trouble doing likewise.”85 The point here is that nothing obligates treaty 
members to attend a proposed “Extraordinary Conference” in the event of an attack or 
threat of an attack on a fellow member, and hence, this handicaps the decision-making 
efforts of the EST. Without a defined, effective means to ensure member participation in 
times of crisis, the EST fails to offer a credible mechanism for Euro-Atlantic collective 
security. To be sure, no treaty regime can compel a state to honor its commitments to take 
military action in defense of an ally or security partner.  
8.  The EST Neglects the Democracy and Human Rights Dimension 
A second criticism of the EST refers to its limited focus.  That is, the EST 
concerns only “basket I” issues, such as geo-political and military affairs, while largely 
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ignoring “basket II and III” issues dealing with economics, the environment, and the 
human dimension. Many critics within the European Union and NATO attribute this 
apparent disregard for “soft issues,” such as human rights and democratization to a 
perceived value gap between Russia and the West, which has persisted since the Cold 
War. In his Helsinki speech in April 2009, Medvedev stated, “in my opinion the future 
treaty should include the basic principles for developing arms control regimes, 
confidence building measures, and measures on restraint and reasonable sufficiency in 
military development. Russia has already made a significant contribution to arms control 
and we remain ready to do so again.”86 From the Russian perspective, this emphasis on 
“hard security” implies that little erosion of the fundamental principles outlined in 
baskets II and III of the Helsinki Final Act has taken place since the end of the Cold War. 
This emphasis also implies that further democratization and protecting the human rights 
of Russians and others in the Euro-Atlantic region are of secondary concern to Moscow. 
The EST’s failure to address such issues, which NATO and the European Union view as 
inseparable components of security, is a prominent flaw. 
Today, the OSCE remains the principal forum for discussing the fundamental 
principles of security and building inter-state trust for action against complex security 
challenges in the Euro-Atlantic region. This forum is rooted in the principles expressed in 
the Helsinki Final Act, as well as the Paris Charter, and it has continued with the “Corfu 
Process” in an effort to restore trust and transparency among the participating states. The 
advancement of democracy and respect for human rights represent essential values in the 
eyes of NATO and EU member states. On December 3, 2008, NATO’s North Atlantic 
Council further underscored the importance of beginning a security dialogue under the 
auspices of the OSCE: 
We underscore that the existing structures—NATO, the EU, the OSCE 
and the Council of Europe—based on common values, continue to provide 
every opportunity for countries to engage substantively on Euro-Atlantic 
security with a broad acquis, established over decades, that includes 
respect for human rights, territorial integrity, the sovereignty of all states, 
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without dividing lines, and the requirement to fulfill international 
commitments and agreements. Within this framework, Allies are open to 
dialogue within the OSCE on security perceptions and how to respond to 
new threats, and seek to the widest possible cooperation among 
participating States to promote a common Euro-Atlantic space of security 
and stability. The common aim should be to improve the implementation 
of existing commitments and to continue to improve existing institutions 
and instruments so as to effectively promote our values and Euro-Atlantic 
security.87 
It is evident that NATO and the European Union continue to uphold a legacy of values, 
which have been successfully embodied in Euro-Atlantic security institutions of today. 
From the perspective of the member states of NATO and the European Union, respecting 
these values has fostered unprecedented peace and stability. Therefore, any proposed 
treaty, such as the EST, which has failed to acknowledge the importance of democracy 
and respect for human rights, lacks credibility in the eyes of NATO and the European 
Union. 
9.  Moscow Lacks Credibility 
Moscow is further criticized for the EST due to its overall lack of credibility in 
upholding the principles it proposes to include in the EST. According to David J. Kramer, 
senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, “the main problem with the 
Russian proposal was that Moscow would itself be violating it.”88 Kramer referred to 
Russia’s suspension of compliance with the CFE Treaty, energy supply cutoffs, cyber 
attacks, and export bans, which have significantly affected European neighbors. 
Furthermore, Moscow itself violates Article 1 of the very treaty it proposes. As 
previously noted, Article 1 stipulates, “any security measures taken by a Party to the 
Treaty individually or together with other Parties, including in the framework of any 
international organization, military alliance or coalition, shall be implemented with due 
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regard to security interests of all other Parties.”89 Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 
clearly defies this article, and as a result, has led NATO and EU members to suspect that 
Moscow simply cannot be trusted in spearheading any proposed revision to the current 
Euro-Atlantic security order. Gary J. Schmitt, a resident scholar and director of advanced 
strategic studies at the American Enterprise Institute, has described the proposed EST as:  
… especially problematic in light of recent Russian behavior in occupied 
Georgia, in the recent military exercises aimed at Poland, in the new laws 
passed by the Duma authorizing military interventions to protect Russians 
and Russian speaking peoples in surrounding states, and in the new 
authorities the Russian president is seeking enabling him to use the 
Russian military on his own authority.90  
In short, many NATO and EU observers continue to maintain that Russia is a revisionist 
power that desires to dominate its neighbors rather than to cultivate constructive and 
balanced relations with them. To expect the Kremlin leadership to behave otherwise is 
simply unrealistic in their view. Therefore, Medvedev’s proposal fails to be credible in 
the eyes of many NATO and EU observers because Moscow has notably failed in recent 
years to uphold the principles that it has advocated for a revised Euro-Atlantic security 
system in the EST.   
10.  The Euro-Atlantic Region Does Not Need Another Security Treaty 
Finally, Western experts have asserted that it is superfluous to add yet another 
security organization in the form of the EST when a reasonably satisfactory security 
order with the necessary growth potential already exists. According to Patrick Nopens, a 
retired Belgian Army general, “the OSCE and its related instruments have all the 
prerequisites to continue to serve as the main collective security organization in the Euro-
Atlantic area where a renewed security dialogue can take place.”91 Russian officials and 
commentators have argued that NATO and EU members have guaranteed their security 
through legally binding treaties at the expense of non-members. Yet, experts in NATO 
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and EU countries contend that the EST would add another tier to a security order already 
saturated with security organizations. In their view, the answer is not establishing another 
overarching security institution. The remedy resides in reforming and making better use 
of the security institutions already set in place. The current Euro-Atlantic security order 
has the capacity to provide security for the entire region, including Russia, if all the states 
in this region respect the principles articulated in the Helsinki Final Act.  
For example, the OSCE is a regional collective security organization consisting of 
a set of institutions based on political commitments. However, legally binding treaties 
also exist within its overall framework, such as the CFE Treaty. In contrast, NATO 
originated as a legally binding collective defense pact consisting of allies committed to 
defend each other against an outside threat. Additionally, the Lisbon Treaty also covers 
members with a legally binding defense clause within the EU, “if a Member State is the 
victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it 
an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of 
the security and defense policy of certain Member States.”92 Moreover, Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations states: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by 
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.93 
Collectively, these treaties all employ legally binding mechanisms, which have 
adequately served the current Euro-Atlantic security order in the past, and remain poised 
to continue in this capacity for the years to come. 
 
92 “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union,” May 9, 2008, Official Journal of the 
European Union, Article 42, paragraph 7. 
93 “Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of 
Aggression,” June 26, 1945, Charter of the United Nations, Article 51. 
 37
                                                
In summary, the Euro-Atlantic region is already well equipped with legally or 
politically binding documents designed to ensure regional collective security. Therefore, 
another legally binding regime, such as the proposed EST, would seem redundant and 
unnecessary. Skepticism abounds from the NATO and EU perspective due to a perceived 
value gap that has continued to erode Medvedev’s credibility in proposing the EST since 
the 2008 invasion of Georgia and the Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
as independent states. Yet, despite these criticisms, both the European Union and NATO 
are willing to engage Moscow in reforming Euro-Atlantic security within the current 
framework. If Moscow is to advance a positive agenda to revise the current security 
order, it must do so while acknowledging the importance of respecting human rights and 
the sovereignty of its neighbors. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has stated U.S. 
policy as follows: 
We intend to use the NATO-Russia Council as a forum for frank 
discussions about areas where we disagree. We will use it to press Russia 
to live up to its commitments on Georgia and to reiterate our commitment 
to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states. We will also use the 
Council to advocate on behalf of human rights and individual liberty—
these are principles and values that Russia committed to uphold when it 
accepted the NATO-Russia Founding Act.94      
Again, these principles are an essential element in revising the Euro-Atlantic security 
system. However, this conflict in perspectives has persisted for decades and has 
continued to hinder efforts to devise a more successful institutionalized security 
partnership between Russia and NATO.  
G.  IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO & THE UNITED STATES 
If the EST was signed, ratified and entered into force, implementing the new 
treaty would have profound implications for NATO and the United States, in particular. 
First and foremost, most NATO members perceive the EST as an attempt by Moscow to 
undermine the Alliance. On May 16, 2009, President Medvedev alluded to Russian 
misgivings about NATO’s influence:  
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As a military and political bloc NATO is becoming larger and security is 
becoming more fragmented and more piecemeal. I think that this is bad for 
everyone concerned, no matter what our negotiating partners say. So we 
need new approaches. There was the Helsinki Final Act [of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]; now we need a new 
document, not something drafted in opposition to NATO but to provide 
security in Europe. And what does security in Europe involve? It has a 
whole set of components, it consists of a whole range of countries: there 
are the European states, that is all the ones in Europe, there’s the United 
States, there’s Canada, there are all the European organizations such as 
NATO and the European Union, the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. So if we can 
create a new matrix of relationships, I think it will be effective. In any 
case, this is obviously better than advancing NATO in every direction. At 
any rate we are not happy with that idea and we are going to respond to 
it.95   
A central pillar of the EST is the objective to guarantee “equal” and “indivisible security” 
in a legally binding form. At first glance, this may appear advantageous for the security 
of states in the Euro-Atlantic region. However, implementation of the EST could trap 
NATO. As a legally binding international treaty, the EST could be used as a powerful 
tool to limit the scope of the Alliance’s defense and security mechanisms. Article 9 of the 
EST states, “the Parties to the Treaty shall not assume international obligations 
incompatible with the Treaty.”96 In theory, NATO members would have to uphold the 
principles of the EST at the expense of the North Atlantic Treaty. This would essentially 
give Moscow veto power over any NATO or U.S. action on the pretext that it either 
would enhance NATO’s security at the expense of Russia’s, or would undermine the 
unity of the common security space.  
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s June 23, 2009 address at the Opening 
of the OSCE Annual Security Review Conference expressed Moscow’s belief in the 
OSCE as an institution capable of controlling NATO’s activities in defense and security 
matters, if reformed appropriately: 
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It would have been enough to consecutively institutionalize and transform 
the OSCE into a full-fledged regional organization within the meaning of 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. That is the OSCE would be dealing with 
the full spectrum of Euro-Atlantic issues and, above all, ensuring in the 
region—based on legal commitments—an open collective security 
system.97  
A reformed and treaty-based OSCE, ensuring the EST’s universal application of 
“indivisible security,” would result in a Euro-Atlantic security arrangement parallel to 
NATO. Therefore, it would not only restrict NATO activities in the security and defense 
realm. It would provide Russia with additional institutional capabilities to influence the 
current Euro-Atlantic security order.   
Despite the inherent conflicts between NATO and the EST, the Medvedev 
proposal presents an opportunity for the United States to take the lead in opening a 
broader dialogue with Moscow concerning common security interests. According to 
Jeffrey Mankoff, Associate Director of International Security at Yale University, opening 
a dialogue for a revised security order, which focuses on common threats “like interstate 
conflict, terrorism, and drug trafficking would give Moscow an incentive to contribute 
positively to Europe’s security while separating these issues from more contentious 
questions related to Russia’s domestic governance and adherence to European human 
rights norms.”98 Reading an agreement that would satisfy Russia regarding its role in 
Euro-Atlantic security promises to be a challenging endeavor. Yet, Russia has objective 
reasons to reduce tensions with its western neighbors due to a rising China to the east, 
and the spread of terrorism within and along its borders. Additionally, the emergence of 
global threats, such as nuclear proliferation, drug trafficking, and the spread of militant 
Islamist movements, further incentivizes Moscow to cooperate with NATO, and 
especially the United States. Moreover, the current economic crisis has increased the 
urgency for both Russia and Europe to reduce tensions leading to future confrontation, 
especially in the energy sector.  
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NATO’s challenge resides in engaging Moscow in constructive security talks, yet 
preserving freedom of action in the event Moscow chooses to play an obstructionist role. 
According to Mankoff, “moving ahead with negotiations would also place the ball in 
Russia’s court.”99 The Alliance has an opportunity to show Moscow that it is not being 
reflexively excluded from the current security order. Furthermore, it has a chance to 
demonstrate to the Kremlin that Russian attempts to weaken or divide NATO will only 
result in further isolation.   
H.  CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided an overview of the Russian case for the EST, as well as 
of the reservations expressed by experts in NATO and the European Union. Most NATO 
and EU commentators view the EST as a largely empty proposal fraught with hidden 
objectives. Moscow’s criticisms of the current Euro-Atlantic security system are well 
documented. Yet, the EST has failed to provide the requisite elements to be considered a 
credible alternative to the current security order. Moscow’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, 
coupled with its reputation as a regional “bully,” have fueled a widespread western 
perception that Russia must be treated with caution. Relations of distrust between Russia 
and many of its neighbors have persisted for decades. It is this legacy, which threatens 
future prospects for security cooperation between Russia and many other members of the 
Euro-Atlantic community. 
Despite its obvious faults, the EST has contributed to broader initiatives to 
relaunch discussions about a revised Euro-Atlantic security order. These broader 
initiatives include the Corfu Process and revived dialogue within the NATO-Russia 
Council and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. NATO, the European Union, and the 
Russian Federation have common interests, including nuclear arms control, climate 








peaceful Euro-Atlantic region, it is vital to build an inclusive security community and 
common security space. This can be achieved by establishing a new security narrative of 
cooperation to meet shared challenges.  
 42
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 43
                                                
III.  NATO’S WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE EST: MOTIVES 
AND IMPLICATIONS  
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines NATO’s willingness to discuss the EST, despite intense 
opposition from some allies and their reservations about cooperation with Moscow. The 
Obama Administration has sought a “reset” of relations with Moscow in an effort to build 
a more cooperative and harmonious relationship than the one which prevailed during the 
final years of the George W. Bush administration. NATO's willingness to discuss the 
EST is more than a by-product of Washington’s rapprochement with Russia. Other 
NATO capitals have their own reasons to favor improved relations with Moscow. 
Russia’s EST proposal presents an opportunity to examine the need for a revised Euro-
Atlantic security order and to explore the prospects for enhanced strategic cooperation 
with Russia. 
B.  WASHINGTON’S RATIONALE FOR RESETTING RELATIONS WITH 
MOSCOW 
The Obama administration has sought a new era in U.S.-Russian relations in an 
attempt to build trust and cooperation through pragmatism in the pursuit of mutual 
interests. Vice President Joseph Biden declared at the February 2010 Munich Security 
Conference, “it’s time to press the reset button and to revisit the many areas where we 
can and should be working together with Russia.”100 President Obama at the April 2009 
London G-20 economic summit joined Russian President Medvedev in making the 
following joint statement: 
The era when our countries viewed each other as enemies is long over, and 
recognizing our many common interests, we today established a 
substantive agenda for Russia and the United States to be developed over 
the coming months and years. We are resolved to work together to 
strengthen strategic stability, international security, and jointly meet 
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contemporary global challenges, while also addressing disagreements 
openly and honestly in a spirit of mutual respect and acknowledgment of 
each other’s perspective.101  
Today, Washington and Moscow share several common interests. In particular, securing 
and reducing nuclear weapon stockpiles, stabilizing Afghanistan, and preventing Iran 
from acquiring nuclear weapons are a few examples, which have garnered recent 
attention. The United States has a compelling reason to reengage with Russia because, 
according to Vice President Biden, “the spread of nuclear weapons is the greatest threat 
facing our country.”102 Moscow also considers nuclear proliferation a threat to Russia, 
and it lacks the resources to sustain its current nuclear arsenal. Both nations, therefore, 
have powerful incentives to cooperate. Since Russia and the United States together 
possess ninety percent of the world’s nuclear weapons, they are in a unique position to 
eliminate a significant portion of the world’s fissile material.103   
U.S. experts agree that Washington’s priorities include gaining Russian 
cooperation on reducing nuclear stockpiles and obtaining Moscow’s help regarding Iran’s 
nuclear programs. Furthermore, according to Tomas Valasek, a Slovak expert on 
European security affairs, it is held within the Obama administration “that Russian self-
interest, rather than U.S. concessions on NATO enlargement or missile defense, should 
drive Moscow’s engagement with Washington.”104  
Overall, Washington has set aside ideology in favor of pragmatism to advance 
strategic cooperation efforts with Moscow. The May 2010 National Security Strategy 
explicitly stated, “we seek to build a stable, substantive, multidimensional relationship 
 
101 “Text of US–Russia Statement on Nuclear Arms,” Pravda, April 1, 2009, 
http://engforum.pravda.ru/showthread.php?245830–Text–of–US–Russia–statement–on–nuclear–arms–AP–
April–1–2009. 
102 Joseph Biden, The Path to Nuclear Security: Implementing the President’s Prague Agenda, 
Remarks of Vice President Biden at National Defense University, Washington, D.C., February 10, 2010, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the–press–office/remarks–vice–president–biden–national–defense–university. 
103 Krickus, Medvedev’s Plan: Giving Russia a Voice but Not a Veto in a New European Security 
System, 5. 
104 Tomas Valasek, Obama, Russia, and Europe (Centre for European Reform, Policy Brief, June 
2009), 1. 
 45
                                                
with Russia, based on mutual interests.”105 In strategic terms, Russia is too important to 
remain on the periphery. Former U.S. Secretaries of State Henry A. Kissinger and George 
P. Schultz wrote in October 2008, soon after the NATO Allies had adopted a “no 
business as usual” approach in the wake of Russia’s use of force in Georgia, that 
“isolating Russia is not a sustainable long-range policy. It is neither feasible nor desirable 
to isolate a country adjoining Europe, Asia and the Middle East and possessing a 
stockpile of nuclear weapons comparable to that of the United States.”106 Indeed, the 
Obama administration has engaged Moscow in areas in which it believes that Russia can 
make a strategic difference—strategic arms control, Iran and Afghanistan—and 
deemphasized issues that have caused prior tensions with Russia, such as NATO 
enlargement. Washington has cautiously changed the psychological climate, and has 
sought Russian engagement on issues in which it has a genuine interest and a key role.     
Despite the EST’s lack of substance, it represents a broader strategic grievance 
between Russia and the countries of NATO and the European Union—that is, what 
Russians regard as the latter’s neglect of Russian security interests. According to a 
Research Advisor at the NATO Defense College, the British scholar Andrew Monaghan, 
“for Moscow, the constant demands for more substance [regarding the EST] are ‘tiring’ 
and miss the point of Moscow seeking a collective discussion—Moscow does not simply 
seek to place proposals on the table to await the critique of the West.”107 It appears that 
in Russian eyes, the EST is a signal to the rest of the Euro-Atlantic community that 
Russia is no longer a Cold War foe, and that Russia has the potential to play a positive 
role in Euro-Atlantic security affairs. The bottom line is that Moscow desires to re-
establish itself as a regional power, and therefore, favors a Euro-Atlantic security order, 
which not only respects Russian interests, but also acknowledges Russia as an elite 
power, as in decades and centuries past.  
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The foundation for strategic cooperation between Russia and the United States is 
pragmatism and a desire to fulfill shared interests. Due to the pervasive U.S. influence in 
NATO, “resetting” U.S.-Russia bilateral relations has implications for the Euro-Atlantic 
security dialogue, especially the NATO-Moscow relationship. Not only is the “reset” 
likely to take precedence in guiding relations between the United States and Russia.  It 
has also led the member states of the Euro-Atlantic community to discuss the prospects 
for a revised Euro-Atlantic security order. Although the EST is unlikely to be considered 
a viable alternative to the current international security institutions, outright rejection 
would further irritate Moscow and complicate broader strategic cooperation efforts with 
Washington and other NATO capitals.  
C.  WHY SHOULD NATO CONSIDER THE EST? 
Despite Russia’s perceived intentions of undermining NATO via the EST, the 
Alliance has acknowledged the necessity to discuss the Russian proposal in the course of 
reviewing the current Euro-Atlantic security order and its capacity to deal with emerging 
security threats. As Secretary Clinton noted in her February 2010 speech at the NATO 
Strategic Concept seminar, “NATO has always been the institutional means through 
which our democracies meet the security challenges of our day. And the issues we’re 
facing now are broader, and arguably more difficult than before.”108 Why then is it 
necessary to consider a proposal, which inherently seeks to undermine the current Euro-
Atlantic security system? This is partly because Europe will remain insecure as long as 
Russia takes a revisionist approach in the region’s security affairs. The power struggle 
between Russia, on the one hand, and NATO and the European Union on the other, has 
been manifest in the competition for influence over the non-Russian former Soviet 
republics and former Warsaw Pact states in Eastern Europe, and in the persistent conflicts 
over energy, military deployments, and arms control. According to the associate director 
of International Security Studies at Yale University, Jeffrey Mankoff: 
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In part, this failure is due to Russia’s retreat into authoritarianism and 
intervention in the affairs of its neighbors, but it is also the result of a 
persistent hesitancy on the part of European institutions to integrate a 
Russia that has not first transformed itself along liberal, democratic 
lines.109 
In other words, neither NATO nor the European Union fully trusts Russia as a 
cooperative partner in the Euro-Atlantic security sphere because of a perceived value gap, 
which has persisted for decades, and which remains a polarizing point of contention in 
NATO-Russian relations.  
Some Russians argue that this lack of trust has perpetuated a “bloc” approach 
towards European security affairs—and thus, has created a division between a growing 
“West” and diminishing “East.” The danger of this division for European security was 
exposed during the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. This conflict occurred within 
the purview of a competition for influence between Russia and NATO in the security 
vacuum that emerged along Russia’s borders after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
absence of a mechanism for preventing—or at least regulating—a conflict of this kind 
raises the possibility of escalation or even further instability in the future. This prospect 
has become more dangerous in light of the struggle for influence between Russia and 
NATO. However, despite this confrontation of interests in former Soviet republics, 
Russia and NATO also face many of the same common threats “ranging from Islamist 
extremism to terrorism and drug trafficking to the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction.”110 Security cooperation between Russia and NATO could be helpful in 
addressing such threats.  
Today, no institutional mechanisms have proven to be capable of aligning the 
strategic interests of NATO and Russia or of achieving a compromise where the two 
sides disagree. Despite the EST’s weaknesses, it represents Moscow’s desire to begin a 
dialogue and define a more satisfactory role for Russia in the Euro-Atlantic security 
community. NATO fundamentally rejects the EST as an attempt to undermine its position 
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as the preeminent Euro-Atlantic security institution. However, it has recognized the 
danger in antagonizing Moscow and the need to develop a security relationship with 
Russia along pragmatic lines. According to a report submitted by the Group of Experts on 
a New Strategic Concept for NATO: 
NATO should pursue a policy of engagement with Russia while reassuring 
all Allies that their security and interests will be defended. To this end, the 
Alliance should demonstrate its commitment to the NRC (and invite 
Russia to do the same) by focusing on opportunities for pragmatic 
collaboration in pursuit of such shared interests as nuclear non-
proliferation, arms control, counter-terrorism, missile defence, effective 
crisis management, peace operations, maritime security, and the fight 
against trafficking in illegal drugs.111 
Therefore, in principle, the NATO alliance is willing to discuss Moscow’s proposal for a 
revised Euro-Atlantic security system and to work with Russia to advance these common 
interests. Yet, the NATO allies will probably be unwilling to act in a manner, which 
diminishes their role in Euro-Atlantic security affairs. 
D.  NATO CHALLENGES IN RE-ENGAGING MOSCOW 
NATO-Russian relations have been constrained by contrasting visions of a 
preferred Euro-Atlantic security order. These visions have differed not only in the desired 
leadership roles of both parties. Russia has also continued to question NATO’s purposes 
in the post-Cold War security order. Moscow has fundamentally disagreed not only on 
the purposes of NATO itself, but also on the membership, it has conferred upon some 
former Soviet republics and the former Warsaw Pact states of Eastern Europe. 
Conversely, NATO has viewed itself as a positive and stabilizing force in the Euro-
Atlantic security sphere, steadily increasing its membership since the 1990s. NATO has 
held that its benign intentions to expand the zone of peace and prosperity in Europe 
would eventually be understood and accepted in Moscow as a benefit to all, and not as a 
threat to Russia. In fact, however, the Kremlin has continued to view NATO enlargement 
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as an encroachment on its traditional sphere of influence. According to James M. 
Goldgeier, a senior fellow for transatlantic relations at the Council on Foreign Relations, 
the core problem with NATO-Russia relations is, “NATO will not allow Russia to have a 
veto over alliance decisions, while Russia believes it is a great power deserving a full 
voice in European security affairs.”112 These issues of power rivalry continue to 
challenge the advancement of a constructive strategic dialogue between NATO and 
Russia. The unresolved issues include devising a revised Euro-Atlantic security order and 
addressing the questions raised by the EST proposal. 
Several challenges, which have continued to burden NATO-Russian relations in 
recent years, originated during the Cold War and in Russian domestic politics during the 
1990s. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow expected NATO to “either 
dissolve itself or engage Russia as an equal and strategic partner in European 
security.”113 Instead, the Alliance steadily enlarged eastward, beginning with a unified 
Germany, then incorporating several Central and Eastern European countries, including 
the Baltic states. Although there were sound reasons for NATO enlargement, such as 
stabilization and security enhancement, the process reinforced the belief in Moscow that 
NATO had not changed its core mission as an alliance directed against Russia. Overall, 
Russia’s perceptions focused on its political losses in Central and Eastern Europe rather 
than on NATO’s vision of promoting stability and cooperation throughout the Euro-
Atlantic region. Therefore, in the post-Cold War world, most Russians have continually 
perceived NATO as an anti-Russian alliance.  
In the 1990s, Russia suffered from political weakness and significant 
socioeconomic challenges. NATO enlargement was a further detriment to the Russian 
psyche, as it was perceived as a national humiliation. According to the President of the 
New Eurasia Foundation in Moscow, Andrei Kortunov, quoted prior to the Helsinki 
Summit between President Clinton and Russian President Yeltsin in March 1997, “it is 
the fear of being isolated, marginalized in a role in Europe, and it goes deep into Russian 
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history. There is a perception in Russia that we are not taking [taken] as Europeans, and 
we are literally pushed out of Europe. We are getting isolated on the continent.”114 
Comparable perceptions have shaped Russian identity for centuries and continue to 
influence Moscow’s outlook on Euro-Atlantic security. Therefore, NATO has become a 
natural focus for increasing anti-Western sentiment in Russia since the 1990s. Embittered 
political elites have found it easier to blame outside forces for Russian misfortunes than 
to address the vast challenges that besiege Russia, which include political corruption and 
demographic decline. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, not only the fundamental 
existence of NATO but also its enlargement has spurred resentment among Russian 
elites. Against this backdrop, the effort to build an institutionalized partnership, which 
transcends the vastly different perspectives of NATO and Russia, has posed a significant 
political challenge.    
NATO in fact faces several broad challenges in developing a functional 
relationship with Russia. To begin, pragmatic cooperation with Moscow is essential for 
maintaining a steady strategic relationship. President Obama noted at the announcement 
of the new START treaty on March 26, 2010, “when the United States and Russia can 
cooperate effectively, it advances the mutual interests of our two nations, and the security 
and prosperity of the wider world.”115 Today, it seems that the interests of both states are 
more aligned than ever before. Both Moscow and Washington have vested interests in a 
stable Afghanistan, counter-terrorism, overcoming the global economic crisis, and anti-
piracy operations. President Medvedev echoed the importance of cooperation with the 
United States in a speech at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. on April 13, 
2010, “we will cooperate with the United States on the most important issues like 
countering terrorism, trans-border crime, and piracy…We are going to overcome the 
effects of the global economic crisis as well because we do not know what the future will 
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be.”116 Despite contrasting perspectives on European security and a perceived value gap 
between Washington and Moscow, pragmatism will continue to encourage strategic 
cooperation due to the advancement of national interests.   
Second, preserving unity among the twenty-eight NATO member states has 
proved increasingly difficult in recent years as the Alliance has expanded and differences 
between members have become even more pronounced. There are major disagreements 
among European member capitals over how to engage Russia. According to Manuel de la 
Camara, of the Real Instituto Elcano, “there is no common view on Russia among the 
EU’s member states. Russia and some EU countries (especially the larger ones) prefer to 
address some of the main issues on a bilateral basis, in particular in the energy area. This 
has prevented the development of a truly comprehensive relationship between Russia and 
Europe.”117 Conversely, allies, such as Poland and the Baltic states, are wary of 
extensive cooperation with Moscow in any field. For example, Laurynas Jonavicius of 
the Eastern Europe Studies Centre in Vilnius, Lithuania, has noted, “emphasis on 
pragmatism in EU-Russia relations should be regarded as an attempt to divide Europe 
from inside by contrasting the actors having different economic interests and 
possibilities.”118 From an Eastern European perspective, Moscow is using its energy 
clout to make an economic appeal to the traditional Western European powers. Gaining 
the support of states, such as Germany and France, would effectively minimize the voice 
of the Eastern European NATO allies and EU members due to their relative economic 
inferiority. In addition, Eastern European NATO allies and EU members are generally 
wary of extensive cooperation with Moscow due to the August 2008 Russian-Georgian 
conflict. From their perspective, the unilateral invasion of a sovereign state and the 
disproportionate use of force are evidence that Russia sim
Maintaining unity among the NATO member states is an essential element for 
establishing a functional long-term relationship with Moscow. As noted in Chapter II, 
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NATO has viewed the EST as an attempt to fragment the Alliance, thereby minimizing 
its effectiveness. Overcoming this challenge will be paramount to not only building 
cooperation with Moscow.  It is also vital in advancing the mutually acknowledged need 
for a revised Euro-Atlantic security order.   
Third, in a post-Cold War world, NATO is challenged to redefine itself as a 
relevant alliance capable of overcoming the unpredictable threats of the present day. The 
development of a new strategic concept, to be published in November 2010, offers 
NATO an opportunity to address this challenge. According to Goldgeier, a new strategic 
concept will allow NATO, “to determine in principle when, where, how, and why it 
needs to act rather than simply responding in an ad hoc manner as new problems arise 
that its leaders determine require alliance action.”119 This may be an unrealistic 
aspiration given the unpredictability of events, but transparency in future policy-making 
and military operations may address some future Russian grievances with NATO. 
Furthermore, transparency is vital for building cooperation with global partners in the 
new multi-polar world order. According to Rolf Mutzenich, a scholar at the Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation in Berlin, “for this purpose, there needs to be a realistic assessment of 
what NATO should and, above all, can do.”120  
Another challenge for NATO in maintaining its relevance is to articulate its role 
in the event of non-military and even non-violent threats that could devastate a society. 
For instance, cyber attacks originating from Russian soil against Estonia in 2007 and 
prior Russian cutoffs of gas supplies through Ukraine have left populations in certain 
NATO member states helpless. If NATO is to remain relevant in today’s world, it “has to 
band together in the face of assaults that threaten a member state.”121 The important 
point is that for NATO to remain relevant, it is vital that an alliance commitment endures 
in which a threat to one member is met collectively
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Perhaps the most pressing challenge of all in NATO redefining itself is whether 
its members have the political will to plan shared commitments and follow through on 
them with sufficient investment and action. According to a professor of National Security 
Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
The NATO allies now face threats and discern security imperatives in 
addition to the classical collective defense contingency of responding to 
‘an armed attack’. They thus have greater latitude—and indeed must 
exercise judgment—in allocating resources to multiple security tasks.122 
Consensus on the Alliance’s purposes is irrelevant without the political will to act on 
them. Some NATO member capitals do more than others to honor alliance commitments. 
This results in discrepancies in “burden sharing.” Despite this enduring issue, strong 
political leadership in defining NATO’s common purposes, maintaining unity in 
achieving them, and transparency in executing NATO’s tasks are paramount for meeting 
the unpredictable threats of today and in the future. 
Building a functional relationship with Moscow demands such elements in order 
to endure for the years to come. NATO has expressed its willingness to remain united and 
advance the prospects of Euro-Atlantic security based on mutual interests with Russia. 
According to the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO, chaired by 
former U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright, “although NATO members view 
Russia from diverse perspectives, the Alliance is united in its desire to engage with the 
leaders of that country in order to prevent harmful misunderstandings and to identify and 
to pursue shared goals.”123 This statement suggests that, despite contrasting perspectives 
regarding Euro-Atlantic security, the NATO allies view Russia as an important player 
whose cooperation is vital for meeting unpredictable threats.  
NATO’s revised Strategic Concept is an opportunity to demonstrate to Russia that 
it has the capacity and political will to overcome the obstacles, which have burdened its 
relationship with Moscow since the 1990s. Moreover, it is also an occasion to express 
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NATO’s willingness to build and maintain a strategic partnership with Russia—one that 
is institutionalized rather than being personality-driven. However, the political will of the 
leadership in NATO capitals will remain important. Unity within the Alliance is vital to 
making this vision a reality. In a broad sense, a revised Strategic Concept is an implicit 
signal towards Moscow, which communicates NATO’s acknowledgement that a revised 
Euro-Atlantic security order is needed. However, it is to be revised under the auspices of 
long-standing security institutions, such as NATO and the OSCE, not under the new legal 
framework envisaged in the EST.   
E.  NATO OBJECTIVES IN RE-ENGAGING MOSCOW 
Within the framework of these larger challenges, NATO has several objectives in 
cultivating a more constructive long-term strategic relationship with Russia. In March 
2009, NATO foreign ministers decided to resume formal meetings and practical 
cooperation under NATO-Russia Council auspices. This decision was consistent with the 
Obama administration’s desire to “reset” relations with Moscow. Since then, noticeable 
strides have been made in building a long-term strategic partnership. The NATO 
Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, noted at a December 4, 2009 NRC formal 
session, “a trusting, productive NATO-Russia relationship is important not just for 
European security, but indeed for global security. Our goal should be to build a true 
strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, based on trust, shared views and shared 
goals.”124  
Reflecting a new political climate in the NATO-Russia partnership, the NATO 
allies have made several important decisions aimed at reinvigorating this relationship. 
First, they agreed on establishing the NRC Work Programme for 2010, which is designed 
to improve the working methods of the NRC itself, to make it a more result-oriented and 
politically relevant structure. Second, Secretary-General Rasmussen initiated a Joint 
Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges, which has identified Afghanistan, 
terrorism, piracy, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as among the many 
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mutual concerns NATO and Russia share. These efforts reflect a realization that NATO 
and Moscow share many of the same concerns in preserving security throughout the 
Euro-Atlantic region. Restoring channels of dialogue and cooperation via the NRC has 
demonstrated the willingness of both NATO and Russia to build a growing strategic 
partnership. 
1.  Cooperation in Afghanistan   
Today, NATO maintains a host of objectives in re-engaging Russia. These 
include cooperation on missile defense, security and prosperity, and Afghanistan. The 
Afghanistan example is especially crucial for NATO because many hold that it must 
succeed in its mission there to remain relevant in the twenty-first century. According to 
the United States Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, 
“Russia’s support of the Afghan people is both vital and wide-ranging.”125 This seems to 
suggest that cooperation with Russia will continue to be a critical factor in the 
stabilization of Afghanistan. NATO and Russia share many of the same interests in 
stabilizing Afghanistan—for example, curbing the spread of Islamic terrorism and drug 
trafficking. The Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a logistical transit corridor that 
involves Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, 
plays an indispensable role in supplying the NATO-led International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) with both lethal and non-lethal supplies.126 It embodies the type of strategic 
cooperation between Russia and NATO that is vital for the stabilization of Afghanistan.  
On January 26, 2010, the Russian and NATO chiefs of staff approved a 
framework military cooperation agreement, which “includes Russia's support for the 
U.S.-led military operation in Afghanistan, specifically military transit via Russian 
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airspace, as well as joint anti-piracy and antiterrorism efforts.”127 Maintaining the NDN 
as an alternative logistics corridor also represents the type of “high politics” cooperation 
with Russia that NATO would like to cultivate. At this point, it appears that NATO is 
keen on incorporating Russian interests in the Euro-Atlantic security order to ensure 
prolonged cooperation in advancing both parties’ interests in Afghanistan and beyond. 
Therefore, outright rejection of the EST without consideration of a revised Euro-Atlantic 
security order might derail laborious efforts to “reset” relations with Washington, and 
also hinder the growth of a NATO-Russian strategic partnership.     
F.  HOW DO NATO MEMBER STATES VIEW THE EST? 
NATO member states have remained united in resisting Russia’s call for a legally 
binding regime for the Euro-Atlantic security order via the EST. Nevertheless, varied 
national interests do exist within the Alliance. Moscow has courted certain allies in an 
effort to gain support for the EST. This has encouraged some NATO capitals to be more 
open to discussing a revised Euro-Atlantic security system. Western European powers, 
such as France, Germany, and Italy, view Russia as a vital economic partner and no 
longer feel directly threatened by the formidable Cold War foe of decades past. Leaders 
of these countries have been invited to Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Sochi to garner 
support for the EST. For example, on a visit to Moscow on July 16, 2008, the Italian 
President, Giorgio Napolitano, declared, “I personally listened to the ideas regarding a 
new architecture for Euro-Atlantic security put forward by the president with great 
interest. Italy’s position will be one of special attention to this issue and openness to 
deeper discussions of the proposal within the European Union.”128 The political message 
to France especially has been mixed with bilateral trade offers and investment 
opportunities. During the 7th International Investment Forum in Sochi in September 2008, 
French Prime Minister François Fillon and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin signed  
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agreements on new bilateral projects in the fields of high technology, energy, and space, 
including cooperation in developing the Shtokman gas field and a joint project to launch 
Soyuz spacecraft from a French launch site.129  
In spite of the economic incentives, French President Nicolas Sarkozy has been 
cautious in responding to the EST. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has joined 
Sarkozy in this opinion, welcoming healthy debate regarding the EST proposal yet 
cautioning against steps that might undermine existing international security agreements 
and structures. In a joint article published in France's Le Monde daily on February 3, 
2009, Sarkozy and Merkel said they were “ready to debate” Medvedev's proposal, “with 
our allies, and with our European partners, and to consider everyone's point of view. By 
doing so, we shall reiterate our confidence and commitment to the EU, NATO and the 
OSCE, to the tried and tested European standards underpinning our security, to the arms 
control and disarmament regime, and trans-Atlantic cooperation.”130 These Western 
European allies are prepared to discuss the need to revise the current Euro-Atlantic 
security system. Yet, it seems they judge that the EST ultimately raises more questions 
than it answers.   
Despite recent improvements in Russia-NATO relations, Georgia, the three Baltic 
states and most Central and Eastern European countries—all states that view NATO as 
the main pillar of Europe's security—remain extremely wary of the EST. Most of these 
countries consider themselves as having been victimized at times by Russian aggression 
over the centuries up to and including the Cold War, and they therefore view the EST as a 
ploy to divide and weaken NATO, and to draw them within Russia’s sphere of privileged 
interest. As previously noted, in their eyes, the 2008 Russian-Georgian crisis is further 
proof that Moscow cannot be trusted as a reliable arbiter of European security affairs.  
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We agree with Russia that the existing security architecture needs 
improvement,” Georgian Foreign Ministry official Sergi Kapanadze 
commented in response to Medvedev’s remarks. However, he said that in 
Tbilisi’s view it is unthinkable that a country “that is violating all 
international documents and agreements” should initiate a new security 
system.131 
By contrast, Azerbaijan and the members of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization—a Russian-led regional body that brings together Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan—support the EST. On May 31, 
2010, the Parliamentary Assembly Council of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) officially declared its support for the EST in an effort to improve 
the European security structure. According to the Chairman of the CSTO Parliamentary 
Assembly (PA), Boris Gryzlov, “the entire space must be within the overall security 
frames and all members of the Council have supported Russian President Dmitry 
Medvedev’s initiative on improving the structure of European security.”132 Furthermore, 
the CSTO PA Council members welcomed the development of the Russian leader’s idea 
and declared their intent to persuade their European colleagues that relations on security 
issues must be based on this approach. The fact that the CSTO’s perspective contrasts 
with that of Georgia and the Central and Eastern European states regarding the EST 
should be no surprise because the CSTO is a Russian-led organization that aspires to 
grow in strength and importance as a rival security institution to NATO. In theory, if the 
EST were to be ratified, it would greatly enhance the CSTO’s prestige as a key factor in 
European and Eurasian security. However, the resources and capacity of the CSTO do 
not match its ambitions—a common theme in Russian foreign policy objectives.  
Overall, it is evident that divergent perspectives persist within the Euro-Atlantic 
region regarding security requirements. Despite varied interests amongst its members, the 
Alliance has recognized that re-engaging Russia in pursuit of a long-term strategic 
partnership is consistent with its “vital interests” and supportive of its intention to remain 
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the preeminent Euro-Atlantic security institution. In doing so, NATO members have 
acknowledged the need to revise the current Euro-Atlantic security system. However, this 
revision is to be done within the structures already set in place within NATO and the 
OSCE. Washington’s “reset” with Moscow will continue to play a major role in NATO’s 
re-engagement with Russia. Although the consensus among NATO members is that the 
EST is not a realistic framework for Euro-Atlantic security, it is unlikely that NATO will 
plan to reject it out of hand. Doing so could add to the list of Russian grievances and 
might derail the re-engagement process. In the end, the EST constitutes an implausible 
vehicle for Euro-Atlantic security because Moscow has little credibility. Its limited 
resources and its reputation as a “regional bully” make many NATO and EU states regard 
such a proposal with caution.   
G.  IS MOSCOW CREDIBLE IN PROPOSING THE EST? 
Both reputation and recent events have greatly reduced Russia’s credibility in 
advancing the EST. From the fourteenth century onwards to the Cold War, Russia has 
sought to expand and maintain an empire largely through coercion and domination 
throughout Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Central Asia. Inevitably, the non-
Soviet former Warsaw Pact states and some former Soviet republics have responded to 
the EST with much skepticism. The fact that the Russians themselves have already 
violated the first article of the very treaty Medvedev has proposed does not bode well for 
Moscow. Article 1 of the EST states, “the Parties shall cooperate with each other on the 
basis of the principles of indivisible, equal, and undiminished security.”133 The 2008 
Russian-Georgian crisis has demonstrated that Moscow neither respects “the indivisible 
security” of a neighboring state, such as Georgia, nor seeks to adhere to the standards that 
it has advocated for a revised Euro-Atlantic security order. 
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the EST is nothing more than a 
hollow aspiration. Russia possesses neither the influence nor the resources to make it a 
reality. With Washington and NATO tied up with their own problems, Russia has been 
left to its own devices, yet has shown little vision or sense of responsibility in its vaunted 
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“zone of privileged interests.” In June 2010, a conflict over gas with Belarus exposed the 
fragility of the newly formed customs union—a Russian-dominated economic club 
comprised of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Claiming that Minsk owed it 
approximately two hundred million U.S. dollars, Russia started to cut gas supplies. The 
Belarusian leader, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, upped the stakes by ordering a cut in transit 
shipments of Russian gas to the EU, arguing that it was also owed money. Eventually 
Gazprom resumed full supply, yet Minsk maintained its claim. Lukashenka has also 
sabotaged the customs union with Kazakhstan and Russia by demanding, “that Russia 
scrap its export duty on oil and oil duty products, which would allow Belarus to buy them 
at Russia’s domestic prices and to re-export them at a profit.”134 In response, Moscow 
again cut gas supplies to Minsk. Other disagreements ranging from Lukashenka’s 
unwillingness to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to Russia’s 
ban on Belarus’s milk products have demonstrated that Moscow has mostly relied on 
coercion to pursue its interests with Belarus. Despite these disputes, Minsk has continued 
to extract large subsidies from Russia while challenging its authority.  
In June 2010, unrest in Kyrgyzstan between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the city 
of Osh spurred interim government appeals for Russian military help. Yet, the Kremlin 
stood back owing to its inability to assert a sufficient military presence to quell the 
violence. A Russian armed forces expert, Alexander Golts, has argued that Russia neither 
had the capacity nor the will for such an intervention, “the Russian army—which largely 
consists of unskilled recruits and is plagued by bullying—is not equipped for the sort of 
peacekeeping operation they were asked to carry out in Kyrgyzstan. Besides, Russia’s 
‘allies’ in the CSTO, particularly nearby Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, have no desire to 
see Russian troops setting a precedent by sorting out the internal affairs of a neighboring 
state.”135 Russia declined to respond to a request that it send troops to Kyrgyzstan, and 
this weakens its claim that the country is part of a Russian zone of privileged interest. 
This situation has reinforced the impression that Russia is unable to play a supportive 
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security role in its own backyard. It seems that the Central and Eastern European 
members of NATO and the EU have grounds for their adamant opposition to the EST. 
Moscow’s capabilities to back up its treaty proposal appear as hollow as the ambition it 
has pursued.  
H.  CONCLUSION 
Despite opposition to the EST proposal, NATO has acknowledged the need to 
revise the current Euro-Atlantic security order. This has helped to lay the foundation for a 
growing strategic partnership with Moscow—a matter of “vital” strategic interest to all 
the NATO allies, including the United States. Washington’s “reset” with Russia has 
spurred recent efforts to build this partnership based on mutual interests. However, re-
engagement with Moscow is about more than just the United States. The various NATO 
and EU member states have their own interests in building a long-term strategic 
partnership with Russia and stand to gain from this endeavor. Both NATO and Moscow 
maintain vastly different perspectives, which have shaped their visions for a future Euro-
Atlantic security order. Multiple challenges lie ahead in reigniting the NATO-Russian 
partnership. Despite these hurdles, both parties understand the need for cooperation.  
NATO has expressed a willingness to review the EST and formally respond to it 
to prevent a derailment of the “reset.” In a speech at the Moscow State Institute for 
International Relations on December 19, 2009, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen 
stated, “President Medvedev has proposed a new European Security Treaty. And of 
course, we can discuss it also in the NRC. But the primary and natural venue for 
discussing these proposals is the OSCE, which brings together all the nations that have an 
interest in discussing President Medvedev’s ideas.”136 These comments reflect NATO’s 
preference to reform the current Euro-Atlantic security system within existing 
institutions. The Alliance has questioned the merits of the EST proposal itself, as well as 
the credibility of Russia as a constructive interlocutor in putting the proposal forward. 
NATO has maintained caution thus far in responding to the EST. In fact, however, 
several NATO member nations believe that the EST is a hollow proposal, which would 
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cause more problems than it would solve. It appears that the EST is a complex and lofty 
vision, which Moscow has neither the will nor the capacity to uphold. In the words of 
Alexander Golts, “Moscow bosses imitate imperial ambitions in the same way they 
imitate democracy.”137  
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IV.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Russia’s proposal for a European Security Treaty (EST) has failed to offer a 
credible alternative to the current Euro-Atlantic security order. Yet, it has succeeded in 
fostering discussions among NATO and EU members about revising the current Euro-
Atlantic security system to meet the emerging threats of the twenty-first century. In a 
post-Cold War world, NATO has acknowledged the necessity of respecting Russia’s 
legitimate interests within the Euro-Atlantic security sphere. Despite doubts and 
reservations regarding the utility of the EST, NATO has agreed to review this proposal to 
prevent a derailment of Washington’s “reset” with Moscow and to maximize prospects 
for constructive NATO-Russian relations.  
This chapter asks the following questions: What conclusions can be drawn from 
Russian President Medvedev’s EST proposal? What course of action should NATO take 
in response to the EST proposal? NATO’s de facto rejection of the EST is unlikely to 
profoundly damage relations with Moscow due to the mutually acknowledged necessity 
of establishing a long-term strategic relationship based on shared interests.    
B.  WHAT CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM THE EST?  
NATO and Moscow hold vastly different perspectives on Euro-Atlantic security. 
Yet, today their strategic interests are in some ways more aligned than ever before. 
Countering threats of terrorism, securing nuclear weapons, preventing Iran from 
becoming a nuclear weapons state, and bringing the war in Afghanistan to a successful 
conclusion are but a few of the interests shared by both parties. These threats can only be 
addressed effectively on the basis of real security cooperation between NATO and the 
Kremlin. This underscores the importance of an institutionalized partnership between 
NATO and Russia—a relationship that not only transcends the personal relationships of 
the political leaders, but also incentivizes cooperation through pragmatism. Although the 
EST proposal has lacked substance, it has symbolized Moscow’s plea for a strategic 
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mechanism to foster Euro-Atlantic security cooperation in a way that not only respects 
Russian interests, but also advances interests shared with NATO and the EU. It is 
important in this regard to distinguish between categories of interests. While NATO’s 
unity must be sustained, it would be dangerous and counterproductive to try to isolate 
Russia.  
1.  Strategic Interests vs. Vital Interests   
NATO’s re-engagement with Russia has been regarded by some observers as a 
by-product of Washington’s “reset” with Moscow—a decision that has acknowledged 
respect for Russia’s legitimate interests as a genuine strategic interest for NATO. Despite 
the EST’s many flaws, the NATO allies recognize that they must walk a fine line in 
rejecting this proposal without hindering long-term cooperation efforts. Strategic 
cooperation with Moscow is of vital strategic interest to all the NATO allies, including 
the United States. 
Relatively few American interests are truly vital, in that policy failures could 
endanger the survival of the United States. According to the Commission on U.S. Policy 
toward Russia, co-chaired by former United States Senators Chuck Hagel and Gary Hart, 
“U.S. interests in combating proliferation and terrorism clearly fall into this strictly 
defined vital category and should receive priority in our foreign policy, both with respect 
to Russia and elsewhere.”138 The United States must have a clear vision of which goals 
are vital and which are important but not vital in dealing with Moscow. Russian interests 
also matter because American policies formulated without regard to Russian perspectives 
are not as likely to succeed in achieving their intended goals.  
According to the Director of the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation in New 
York, Andranik Migranyan, a former member of the Russian Presidential Council, 
“although no member of the Obama administration will mention it publicly, the change in 
Washington’s approach was made in the spirit of the recommendations” advanced in the 
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Hagel-Hart report.139 Further analysis of the Hagel-Hart report concluded, “in pursuing 
its ‘vital interests,’ at a certain stage, a country sometimes has to either sacrifice or pay 
less attention to secondary interests. That is because quite often one set of interests 
contradicts the other.”140  
Beyond Washington, this analysis seems to apply to NATO as a whole. Despite 
varied, often contradictory interests among members, the NATO allies have recognized 
the vital importance of respecting Russia’s legitimate interests in a revised Euro-Atlantic 
security order. Much to the chagrin of some observers in Central and Eastern Europe, the 
Alliance must consider the Russian perspective to effectively advance its long-term 
objectives.  Neglecting Russian interests would be a prescription for the failure of NATO 
policies that require Russian cooperation. Moreover, such neglect would exacerbate 
Moscow’s grievances toward NATO and possibly encourage Russia to adopt a more 
antagonistic attitude.  
It seems that the other NATO allies have followed Washington’s lead in pursuing 
a more pragmatic relationship with Moscow because they share the same vital interests in 
combating nuclear proliferation, preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state, 
stabilizing Afghanistan and countering terrorism. For example, in May 2010, the NATO-
Russian Council (NRC), meeting in a Military Representation (MR) session, “approved 
the NRC-MR Work Plan for 2010 and expressed the will and ambition to bring NATO-
Russia military-to-military cooperation to a higher level over the next year.”141 At this 
stage, NATO-Russia cooperation is sub-optimal. However, the steps taken since 1991 
constitute a necessary beginning to a long-term process. 
It seems that NATO’s willingness to discuss the EST is, in effect, an implicit 
recognition that Russian cooperation is necessary to pursue future NATO policies. 
Russian cooperation is a vital strategic interest to NATO because it will ensure that future 
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NATO-Russia endeavors are effectively pursued. In addition, it will enhance NATO’s 
relevance as a security institution capable of addressing today’s unpredictable threat 
environment. Although NATO and Moscow have different perspectives concerning Euro-
Atlantic security, they share vital common interests, which may prove to be the 
foundation for a long-term strategic partnership. A looming question is whether NATO 
can remain united in this effort and maintain the political will to see this commitment 
through. 
2.  NATO Must Remain United  
The EST proposal presents an arrangement that would improve Russian security 
and undermine that of the Alliance. Therefore, it is critical for NATO to maintain unity of 
purpose in responding to the EST. This endeavor poses significant challenges because 
several NATO allies regard Russia’s revival as a menace to their own sovereignty. 
According to the associate director of International Security Studies at Yale University, 
Jeffrey Mankoff:  
Only the United States, with its overwhelming hard and soft power, can 
convince the Europeans to take a chance on integrating Russia more fully 
into the European security structure by exercising political leadership and 
reinforcing its commitment to uphold the security of all its European 
partners.142 
The most prominent reason for NATO skepticism regarding the EST is the fear that a 
legally binding treaty would hinder its ability to execute its collective defense 
responsibilities and allow Moscow to divide and rule. U.S. leadership is therefore crucial 
to quell potential divisions among the NATO allies, most notably the divide on some 
issues between certain states of Central and Eastern Europe and their Western European 
counterparts. Furthermore, this is why the process must be defined as Euro-Atlantic 
rather than simply European. Moscow has acknowledged the need to include Washington 
in the process of devising a new security order. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev 
stated on March 5, 2010 at a Russian Defense Ministry session, “the reaction to Russia’s 
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initiative regarding a European security treaty largely acts as a barometer of our relations 
with the U.S. and NATO.”143 Thus far, the Alliance has demonstrated resolve in 
remaining united despite varied perspectives among the allies regarding Moscow and the 
EST. Maintaining unity along with continued political will to revise the Euro-Atlantic 
security order within the current international institutions, including NATO and the 
OSCE, will be a demanding effort. Yet, re-engagement through pragmatism is likely to 
motivate both sides to pursue a revised Euro-Atlantic security system based on shared 
strategic interests. 
3.  Russian Isolation Would Be Dangerous and Counterproductive 
Various Western and Russian commentators agree that continual isolation of 
Russia would inevitably lead to confrontation. History provides grounds for such a 
judgment. For example, it can be argued that the failure of Britain and France to make a 
more generous settlement with Germany after World War I was one of the factors that led 
to the most devastating war in human history. Conversely, after World War II, the United 
States welcomed West Germany and Japan into a U.S.-led security system, and thus, 
provided a stable place for both states in the post-war environment and a pathway to 
prosperity. Despite the reservations of several NATO allies concerning the Alliance’s 
latest re-engagement with Moscow, they recognize that it would be dangerous to try to 
isolate Russia. According to Richard J. Krickus, “if defeated countries are not integrated 
into the post-war security system, they may eventually undermine it.”144  
Many Russians had a sense of defeat after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and 
have been wary of NATO’s policies, including enlargement. Therefore, considering the 
EST (despite its obvious flaws) would be advantageous to NATO and the European 
Union because it would be another positive step towards recognition of Moscow as a 
strategic partner within the future Euro-Atlantic security order.  
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Many challenges remain in this process, and no clear solution exists at the present 
time. Above all, the most compelling question in acknowledging Russian security 
interests has been formulated by Richard J. Krickus as follows: “how to provide Russia 
with a voice but not a veto in crafting a new Trans-Atlantic security system?”145  
In order to advance the shared strategic interests of NATO and Russia, legitimate 
Russian interests obviously need to be respected. The EST proposal has not only 
provided Moscow a point of departure to express its grievances. It has also advanced the 
Russian security agenda to the forefront of NATO priorities and has inspired the Corfu 
Process under the auspices of the OSCE. Therefore, the EST proposal has proven to be a 
catalyst for revising the Euro-Atlantic security order. Yet, in order to advance Moscow’s 
security interests, NATO must feel that it can benefit from this endeavor as well.  
Although the EST proposal leaves much to be desired, NATO should continue to 
re-engage with Moscow and consider the general idea behind it in depth. Moving ahead 
with discussions would also put the ball in Russia’s court. According to Mankoff: 
Given the West’s concern about Russia’s real intentions, the United States 
and its European allies need to have a flexible approach, allowing Moscow 
to participate in a constructive way, but preserving their freedom of action 
in the event that Russia chooses to play a solely negative, obstructionist 
role.146 
Inviting the Kremlin to modify the current EST proposal to provide a more realistic 
vision for Euro-Atlantic security would be a true test for Moscow. NATO and the 
European Union must demonstrate to Moscow that it is not being excluded from the 
current Euro-Atlantic security order by giving greater substance to the NATO-Russia 
Council and other cooperative frameworks. However, the NATO allies must also 
demonstrate that Russian attempts to weaken or divide the Alliance would be 
counterproductive in terms of Russia’s own political and security interests.  
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C.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE WAY AHEAD 
Many western and Russian commentators have provided recommendations for a 
way ahead to re-engage Moscow, and pursue a Euro-Atlantic security structure inclusive 
of Russian interests. Responding to requests by American and Russian officials, 
concurrent studies have taken place to encourage debate over security issues in the Euro-
Atlantic region. Three such studies are examined: the East-West Institute, the Euro-
Atlantic Security Initiative, and the NATO Group of Experts.  
1.  The East-West Institute  
The East-West Institute—an international, non-partisan think tank—convened 
two seminars, one in Brussels in cooperation with the Egmont Institute, and one in 
Moscow, organized with the Institute for World Economy and International Relations 
(IMEMO). As a result of these seminars, a report was published in June 2009, which 
concluded, “states of the Euro-Atlantic region should embrace a common strategic vision 
of security issues.”147 Furthermore, it was concluded that this vision be based on the 
following principles: 
 recognition of the pluralism of decision-making centers in the security 
sphere and the need for them to cooperate; 
 preparedness to negotiate from a position of respect for the declared 
security interests of all states; 
 the right of each state to determine its own security arrangements; 
 striving to convert conflicts in the Euro-Atlantic security sphere into win-
win situations; 
 a commitment to confidence-building, especially to policies that would 
facilitate collective action for preventing, containing, or reversing 
unfolding crises.148  
 




                                                
In short, the panel of experts agreed that Russian interests should be taken into account in 
a revised Euro-Atlantic security order and that Russia should be treated as an equal by all 
regional member states.  
In the final analysis, three possible paths towards strengthening Euro-Atlantic 
security were presented, and these paths represented the three main strands of opinion 
among the experts. The first path emphasized maintaining the institutional status quo, yet 
advocated remedial repairs, such as removing mutual misperceptions, strengthening 
transparency and confidence, and pursuing common interests in the Euro-Atlantic zone.  
The second path suggested reforming the overall architecture of Euro-Atlantic 
security by signing and bringing into force the EST. According to this approach: 
The Treaty should translate political commitments in the security sphere 
taken by OSCE members at different times into legal obligations. The 
treaty should also provide mechanisms ensuring universal application of 
this principle.149 
For champions of the EST, the key to ensuring its success is to respect the legitimate 
security interests of all states in the Euro-Atlantic region. In addition, proponents of the 
EST hold organizations, such as the OSCE, NATO, the CSTO, and the EU, must be 
involved in the creation of this new Euro-Atlantic security order. Despite such lofty 
goals, it is doubtful that the OSCE and NATO would be supportive of a treaty that 
fundamentally attempts to undermine their autonomy. This fact seemingly dooms this 
suggested path as the most unrealistic of the three paths recommended for consideration.  
The third path advocated partial reconstruction of the current Euro-Atlantic 
security order. The elements of this third path include: 
identifying additional and creative political, legal, and military 
arrangements, possibly including overlapping security guarantees, that 
address potential security concerns of states in Central and Eastern Europe 
and the Black Sea region; pursuing common interests beyond the Euro-
Atlantic zone.150 
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Of the three possible scenarios, partial reconstruction presents the most plausible 
course for a revised Euro-Atlantic security order because its revision of the existing 
security system enhances its legitimacy in the eyes of the Euro-Atlantic community in the 
spirit of the Corfu Process. In addition, this recommendation would not only implicitly 
respect Russian interests, but also recognize the security concerns of the states of Central 
and Eastern Europe. According to the paper, “the United States, NATO, the EU, and 
Russia need to partially reform existing institutions in order to establish real forms of 
power sharing and measures of ‘cooperative-collective security’ in a great region 
stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Caucasus.”151   
Some concrete measures to help facilitate such a proposal include the following: 
Practical steps that will defuse the tensions in the southern Caucasus that 
have not dissipated after the August 2008 war…Russia, the EU, the 
OSCE, and the UN—working with the countries concerned—should take 
immediate measures to conclude legally binding agreements on non-use of 
force between sides of the conflict… [and] to resolve on a compromise 
basis the problem of monitoring the security and military situation;… 
Joint U.S-European-Russian cooperation on BMD defenses as a 
precaution against potential threats coming from outside the Euro-Atlantic 
region… 
The development of a system of cooperative collective security through 
sub-regional security communities and new variable military consultative 
structures…as opposed to trying to define spheres of influence between 
the United States/NATO and Russia/CSTO within the Black Sea and 
Caucasus regions. 
NATO, the EU, and Russia can together or in parallel provide mutual and 
overlapping security guarantees to countries that seek those guarantees 
(Georgia and Ukraine may be among them).152 
One way to accomplish such a task would be to establish operational measures in which 
various parties could collaborate. For example, one possible model could be the 
peacekeeping command system erected in Bosnia after the Dayton accords in 1995. 
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Much will depend upon the willingness of Washington and Moscow to agree to sincerely 
engage in a reform of the status quo. Even if the political will exists to pursue such 
reform, both Russia and the United States will need to do so “without undermining well-
established institutions, such as NATO, and without ignoring new structures, such as the 
CSTO.”153 The East-West Institute report has helped to clarify the debate regarding 
Euro-Atlantic security reform and has outlined a focused set of choices. It has also helped 
to facilitate discussions about the prospects for revising the Euro-Atlantic security order 
and making it capable of meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century.   
2.  The Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative 
At the request of both Russian and American officials, a commission known as 
the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI) embarked upon a two-year study beginning 
in December 2009. Its objective is to help enhance the existing Euro-Atlantic security 
structure of the twenty-first century. In coordination with the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace—a global public-policy think tank—twenty-five public figures, 
former policymakers, business executives, military leaders, and policy analysts have 
begun an extensive effort to develop means for cooperation between the West and 
Moscow within a revised Euro-Atlantic security order. Some of the conclusions thus far 
have paralleled those of the East-West Institute report. For instance, according to Sam 
Nunn, a former U.S. senator and one of the three co-chairs of the EASI, “there can be no 
coherent, effective global-security strategy that does not take into account Russia, its 
strengths, its weaknesses, its aims and its ambitions.”154 Again, this statement reiterates 
the fact that Russian interests need to be incorporated into a revised Euro-Atlantic 
security structure. Another one of the EASI co-chairs, Wolfgang Ischinger, said on the 
same occasion, “one of the real challenges of our way of thinking about security requires 
that we move from thinking in zero-sum terms to a way of thinking in win-win terms.”155  
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A second theme repeated by the EASI commission is that the vital interests of 
NATO and Russia are more aligned now than ever before. In Sam Nunn’s words, “I don’t 
think there’s been in any time in history, certainly not in modern history, where the real 
essential interest, true interest, vital interest of the great powers, basically including 
Europe, U.S., and Russia but also including Japan, China and many other nations, where 
those interests have aligned as they do today.”156  
This assertion not only echoes the conclusions of the East-West Institute report, it 
further complements one of several conclusions from the March 2009 report authored by 
the Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, co-chaired by Chuck Hagel and Gary 
Hart. In short, cooperation with Russia is in NATO’s vital interest because NATO and 
Russia share many of the same security interests—for example, building a secure and 
stable Afghanistan, curbing terrorism, and preventing the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction.  
Furthermore, there is wide consensus among Western experts and politicians that 
a revised Euro-Atlantic security structure should be pursued within existing institutions, 
and should not take the form of a legally binding treaty, such as that outlined in Russia’s 
EST proposal. It seems that this debate has revealed a dividing line between Moscow and 
NATO, and that neither side is willing to bend. The EASI commission has not yet 
presented any concrete proposals for revising the existing Euro-Atlantic security order. 
However, it plans to encourage constructive debate with the intention of building trust 
and transparency and contributing to future policy initiatives.  
3.  The NATO Group of Experts and NATO’s Strategic Concept 
Revising NATO’s Strategic Concept may prove to be a vital step in providing 
renewed recognition to Russian security interests. In May 2010, the NATO Group of 
Experts, chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, submitted a report 
outlining recommendations for a new NATO Strategic Concept. Recommendations for an  
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alliance re-engagement with Moscow and the incorporation of Russian security interests 
were presented throughout the document, which underscored the importance of such a 
task.  
To begin, the Group of Experts has acknowledged, “the new Strategic Concept 
should reaffirm NATO’s desire to help build a cooperative Euro-Atlantic security order 
which includes security cooperation with Russia.”157 Bearing this in mind, the Group 
stated that engagement with Russia is a priority, but not at the expense of defending the 
security interests of NATO allies. For example, at NATO military headquarters in Mons, 
Belgium, planners are thinking about how to defend Eastern European members from 
Russian attack. According to NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen, “we have all 
necessary plans in place to defend and protect all allies. I think the Russians would be 
surprised if we didn’t. That’s the core purpose of the alliance.”158 Commitment to the 
NATO-Russian Council (NRC) should be the focus of the Alliance in collaborating with 
Moscow along pragmatic lines.  
The Group of Experts has expressed hope in building a strategic relationship with 
Russia. However, Moscow’s foreign policy unpredictability remains a concern. 
Therefore, the Alliance must remain cautious in re-engagement: 
The Strategic Concept can be instrumental in unifying the Allies’ views on 
Russia, clarifying NATO’s intentions towards Moscow, and laying the 
groundwork for more substantive cooperation. Because Russia’s future 
policies toward NATO remain difficult to predict, the Allies must pursue 
the goal of cooperation while also guarding against the possibility that 
Russia could decide to move in a more adversarial direction.159 
This statement implies that NATO’s revised Strategic Concept will not only incorporate 
Russian security interests into the fold, but it will also maintain unity within the Alliance 
and hedge against the risk that the Kremlin might adopt “adversarial” policies.  
 
157 NATO Group of Experts, NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement: Analysis and 
Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO, May 11. 
158 Rasmussen quoted in “The Allies Reach Out to the Kremlin, and Start to Think about the 
Unthinkable,” The Economist (July 31, 2010): 39. 
159 NATO Group of Experts, NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement: Analysis and 
Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO, May 16. 
 75
                                                
The NATO allies remain committed to upholding the framework for a NATO-
Russian partnership spelled out in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 2002 
Rome Declaration. According to the Group of Experts, “both documents express a 
commitment to identify and to pursue opportunities for joint action based on mutual 
interests and the understanding that security in the Euro-Atlantic region is indivisible.”160 
The NRC provides the forum for consultation, transparency, consensus-building, and 
making and implementing decisions. Therefore, the Group of Experts recommended, “the 
Allies should work with Russia to ensure an agenda for the NRC that responds in a frank 
and forward-looking way to the security concerns of both sides, and that identifies 
specific areas for joint action.”161 This recommendation is rather broad but nevertheless 
makes some valid points. First, by reaffirming the role of the NRC as the central 
mechanism for NATO-Russian cooperation, the report is explicitly stating to Moscow 
that the institutions are already in place to build a long-term, institutionalized partnership. 
However, both sides must be willing to trust in the system, and that will be a tall order to 
accomplish. Next, NATO wishes to not only build transparency with Moscow, but also to 
continue to strengthen institutions, which have predictable protocols and procedures in 
order to ensure that this transparency is institutionalized. Again, this will remain a 
continuing challenge. Yet, these initial steps recommended by the Group of Experts 
constitute a critical starting point for bringing these ideas to life. 
D.  CONCLUSION  
NATO’s consideration of the Russian EST proposal and the course of action 
recommended by various Russian and western experts have provided an opportunity to 
widen the debate about how a revised Euro-Atlantic security order should be pursued in 
the years to come. Although it is too soon to determine how NATO will fully incorporate 
Russian security interests into the future Euro-Atlantic security order, it is evident that the 
Alliance recognizes the importance of acknowledging Russia as an equal partner, which 
shares many of same strategic interests. Therefore, it is vital that this partnership develop 
 
160 NATO Group of Experts, NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement: Analysis and 
Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO, May 26. 
161 Ibid., 27. 
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along pragmatic lines to help ensure long-term cooperation. However, as the East-West 
Institute, the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, and the NATO Group of Experts have 
emphasized, a revised Euro-Atlantic security order should be pursued under the auspices 
of existing institutions.  
Convincing Moscow that these structures take Russian interests into account will 
be a formidable task because of the legacy of mistrust on both sides. Yet, it is more 
realistic and practical to revise the working relationship of the NRC than to legally bind 
all the countries of the entire Euro-Atlantic region under a Russian-proposed security 
treaty. In the end, there are no simple solutions to address the interests and security 
concerns of all the NATO allies and Russia in a revised Euro-Atlantic security system. 
The recommendations brought forth by commissions, such as the East-West Institute, the 
EASI, and the NATO Group of Experts have served their purpose in fostering healthy 
debate and thereby shaping the future Euro-Atlantic security order. Despite the EST 
proposal’s many flaws, it too has helped to bring this debate to the forefront of Euro-
Atlantic security affairs. In the end, there are no simple answers to these complex 
questions.  
Only time will tell if NATO and Moscow can exert the political will to establish a 
constructive, long-term, institutionalized partnership. The key will be respect for the 
legitimate security interests of Russia and the NATO allies.  
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